Este es un foro dedicado a las Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas así como de los diferentes Cuerpos de Policía y demás entes que se dedican a la Seguridad interna de México.

Bases Chinas internacionales - Navales, aereas y combinadas - ubicaciones, infraestructura, notas e imagenes

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Bases Chinas internacionales - Navales, aereas y combinadas - ubicaciones, infraestructura, notas e imagenes

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 6/2/2016, 5:02 pm

En movimientos estrategicos,  China muestra la geopolitica con este movimiento
de establecer una Base Naval en Djibouti(Bab-al-mandeb) con propositos de
abastecimientos (propios y de proveeduria a las necesidades locales), en una
ubicacion clave frente a la terminacion del Mar Rojo y el Golfo de Aden.
 No termina el acuerdo, sino inicia una postura de ubicarse en los puntos
claves de transito maritimo, y por la habilidad de reabastecerse en zonas
aun por revelarse.
 La presencia China en el continente Africano, crea la puerta para el intercambio
de ida y venida de recursos y bienes generados en su plataforma continental.

China's First Overseas Base in Djibouti Will 'Help Fleet'
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20:29 06.02.2016(updated 20:40 06.02.2016) Get short URL

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China's first overseas naval logistics support outpost is estimated to be built in Djibouti and it is reported that it would be used to take care of problems faced by China’s peacekeeping fleet, the Foreign Ministry told China Daily on Thursday.

Djibouti's President Ismail Omar Guelleh was quoted by Reuters as saying that China was expected to start work on the facility soon.

Recently, China and Djibouti have “reached consensus” regarding the construction of logistical facilities in the African state and the much anticipated deal has finally been confirmed.

According to the ministry the new outpost ‘is essential to implement highly effective logistical support.’

Djibouti's Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf told Reuters, “We understand that some Western countries have worries about China's willingness to have military outposts outside of China.” He said that Western countries should not be concerned.

He further said that the country is vital in the Horn of Africa situated between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. It is a key transfer stop for international humanitarian missions, including those of the United Nations.

Zhang Junshe, a senior researcher at the PLA Naval Military Studies Research Institute, said Djibouti is one of the closest major ports to Somalia. Its peaceful environment is suitable to China's support facility.

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Zhang said the station that China plans to build there is designed to provide food, water and oil. It would be totally different from US military bases, which supply weaponry, Zhang added.

Djibouti's strategic importance was emphasized last year when Chinese citizens evacuated from Yemen transited there.
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Re: Bases Chinas internacionales - Navales, aereas y combinadas - ubicaciones, infraestructura, notas e imagenes

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 1/3/2016, 11:18 pm

Si habia propositos de establecer una base en Dijibouti, ahora queda claro
que ya iniciaron su construccion, para establecer su base de rehabastecimiento
de su flota internacional que cruce, arribe y se provea de equipo, material y
suministros para su continuo transito hacia operaciones diversas en la zona.
Los limites de autosuficiencia naval, les dara una trayectoria prolongada
que les permita retomar proyectos, posicionar sus naves de avanzada,
y responder de acuerdo a las evoluciones por surgir en el medio oriente.

Paises Europeos, sepan que ya llego a quedarse su lejano vecino: CHINA!!!!

China says starts construction of Djibouti military base

Thu Feb 25, 2016 10:53am GMT Print | Single Page [-] Text [+]
BEIJING (Reuters) - China has begun construction of a logistics base in Djibouti, the Ministry of Defence said on Thursday, what the Horn of African country's government calls a military facility that will be China's first overseas.

Last year, China said it was in talks to build what it describes as naval "support facilities" in the Horn of Africa nation, which has fewer than a million people but is striving to become an international shipping hub.

Djibouti, strategically located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea on the route to the Suez Canal, is already home to U.S. and French bases, while other navies often use its port.

China and Djibouti have reached consensus on the facility, which will be used primarily for military rest and resupply in carrying out naval escort, peacekeeping and humanitarian duties, Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said.

"Currently, initial construction on the relevant facilities has already started and China has already dispatched some personnel to launch relevant work," Wu told reporters at a regular monthly press briefing.

He did not elaborate.

China had conducted anti-piracy operations in the region in recent years and is seeking to expand its capacity to respond to growing threats to its interests abroad.

President Xi Jinping is reforming the military and investing in submarines and aircraft carriers, as China's navy becomes more assertive in its territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas.

China is also expanding its peacekeeping role, with Xi pledging in September to contribute 8,000 troops for a United Nations stand-by force that could provide logistical and operational experience the military would need to operate farther abroad.
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Re: Bases Chinas internacionales - Navales, aereas y combinadas - ubicaciones, infraestructura, notas e imagenes

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 8/7/2017, 9:56 pm

PUERTO PAKISTANI COMO BASE CHINA(Puerto Gwadar), no solo involucra su primera base en
el centro entre India e Iran, sino su cercania a la Base en Africa de Djibouti, y
por los acuerdos bilaterales entre China y Pakistan, las rutas terrestres conectadas entre ambas naciones, facilitaran el apoyo logistico de las operaciones Navales Chinas.
 Esto ha desatado una habilitacion por parte de la India, de establecer su propia base
en el sur de la Bahia de Bengal,  en las Islas Andaman, para neutralizar la ya detectada
presencia de submarinos Chinos navegando esas aguas, lo que se espera es que
China tenga su presencia en Bangladesh   o incluso Tailandia, por su fuerte presencia
en la comercializacion de buques navales de fabricacion China.

 La presencia de naves y submarinos Chinos en una negociacion bilateral entre Sri Lanka y China, para recibir y repostamiento de sus Fuerzas Navales en conjunto, mueve las
olas y transforma la percepcion de sus movimientos en el Oceano Indico.
 Esta es una clara Directiva China, que sus costas, no son limitacion para proyectarse
hacia otros mares y oceanos.  

El atribulado Mar del Sur de China, es solo una escala
tecnica de todo el mapa orquestado para la navegacion Militar China en todo su esplendor.


From Gwadar to Chabahar, the Makran Coast Is Becoming an Arena for Rivalry Between Powers

No matter what role the ports play in the future – intensifying regional and global rivalries or stimulating development – the Makran coast finds itself at the brink of emerging from isolation.


A map depicting parts of the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia. Credit: Iran Review
A map depicting parts of the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia. Credit: Iran Review
The coasts of Makran or Makuran – as it is pronounced by the local people – is a region comprising about 1,500 km of shoreline along the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean, which is located in Iran’s Hormozgan, and Sistan and Baluchestan provinces as well as Pakistan’s Balochistan province. Throughout history and before Omani Arabs gained a more dominant position, this shoreline had been recorded in history as the Sea of Makran. The Makran coast starts from Alkouh region north of Iran’s Mina port and is considered an Iranian coast until it reaches the border between Iran and Pakistan in Gwater Bay in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province. Thereafter, that is, from Gwater Bay to Lasbela District, which is located north of Karachi port, it is considered as part of Pakistan’s shoreline. Apart from the strategic importance that the coast of Makran has for the two countries of Iran and Pakistan, this region has been in focus of world powers’ attention for a long period of time, so that, part of regional developments in the past two decades have been associated with efforts made by countries to have access to this coastline.

A history of rivalry

Two port cities – that is, Karachi, which is the capital city of Pakistan’s Sindh province, and Iran’s Bandar Abbas port city – are located on the two ends of the Makran coastline and are of special strategic importance. Within the Makran region there are two more Iranian and Pakistani ports, namely Chabahar and Gwadar ports, which are located in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan and Pakistan’s Balochistan provinces and have recently attracted attention of two regional rival powers, that is, India and China. Of course, before the defeat of the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan and prior to total disintegration of the Eastern power bloc, such rivalries were going on behind the scenes between two Eastern and Western blocs. It has been said that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a former prime minister of Pakistan and leader of the Pakistan People Party, had gotten very close to signing an agreement in the later years of the 1970s according to which Pakistan was to allow the former Soviet Union to build a naval base in Gwadar port. In other words, some believe that the coup d’état staged by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, a former president of Pakistan, and subsequent execution of Bhutto were not unrelated to the Gwadar project.

The United States’ reaction to that project was a plan to build a naval base in Iran’s Konarak region near the port city of Chabahar, which was aborted following the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. As some analysts have speculated, the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union was also not unrelated to the Makran coastal region, because after efforts by Russians failed and Americans dominated both sides of the Makran coast, the leaders of the Soviet Union focused on Afghanistan in order to open a new way toward Balochistan and Makran coasts. According to the project planned by Russians, leftist groups related to Russians within borders of the Iranian and Islamic civilisation from Hindu Kush Mountains to Makran coastal region, were expected to come up with a new power structure in the form of some sort of federalism or confederalism. According to this plan, two important ports of Gwadar in Pakistan’s Balochistan and Chabahar in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan provinces were supposed to get connected through a network of railroads to Central Asia in order to facilitate military movements of the Soviet Union.

Following the collapse of the second and Eastern power bloc and the subsequent power void, especially in Afghanistan, no major change took place in the nature of rivalries over the Makran coasts and only actors involved in these rivalries became more diverse. It appears that the US and Russia have somehow reduced their attention to this region, but China and India are now engaged in a more serious rivalry over this region. Meanwhile, Afghanistan and Central Asia – which now includes five countries born out of the former Soviet Union – are still the pivot of the “big game.” There are, however, new signs which show that Russia and the US are paying renewed attention to the Makran coasts. At present, however, India and China have changed the nature of their rivalry from “military” to “economic and trade” rivalry and are accordingly planning their presence in two port cities of Gwadar and Chabahar.

Gwadar and Chabahar: ports to development

China and Pakistan look upon the Gwadar port as an active and prosperous economic and trade hub similar to Hong Kong and Singapore and are planning to turn it into a free trade port. If done, this project will not only take Pakistan’s Balochistan province out of its current state of isolation and put it on track for development, but will also give an impetus to development of a bigger geographical region, which extends from China’s Muslim-dominated Xinjiang province to Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is almost the same region, which corresponds to the same Iranian and Islamic civilisation region that was eyed by the former Soviet Union. In addition, various road and rail projects, which have been agreed upon by Pakistan and China and some of them are currently underway – including the Makran highway – will connect Karachi to Gwadar and are telltale signs of the strong political will in Beijing and Islamabad to go ahead with this project.

In addition, China’s presence and investment in Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which is an important part of China’s USD 46-billion deal with Pakistan, is expected to go far beyond simple economy and trade. China is building its first foreign naval base in Pakistan’s Gwadar port so that it would be able to play its role as an emerging power in future developments of South Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia. According to China’s plan, the Makran highway is to connect Gwadar port through Karakoram region to Kashghar, the capital city of China’s Xinjiang province. In parallel to that highway, a railroad and a gas pipeline are to facilitate China’s access to energy resources in the Persian Gulf and enable it to conduct trade through Gwadar port. Also, railroad and road branches are finally supposed to connect Gwadar to Quetta, which is the capital city of Pakistan’s Balochistan province, while it will be also connected to Afghanistan and Central Asia through the Wesh–Chaman international border crossing between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In contrast to this joint project by China and Pakistan, Iran and India are bent on implementing a similar project in Chabahar port, which is about 70 km away from Gwadar, in order to use rail and road to connect Chabahar to Sistan and Baluchestan’s capital city of Zahedan. From there, it will be connected to Iran’s national railroad network in the city of Birjand and will then continue to Central Asia. The same railroad will give out a branch in the city of Zabol to enter Afghanistan and make its way into Central Asia. Both projects in Gwadar and Chabahar ports are expected to finally fuel all-out human, economic, trade and cultural development across the entire South Asia and Central Asia while sweeping through Iran and Afghanistan as well. This region is known as the geographical domain of poverty, which is prone to growth of radical religious or ethnic currents which oppose any system of government. An example to the point is the emergence of the Daesh Takfiri terrorist group and its Islamic State, whose purported Greater Khorasan or eastern caliphate corresponds to the geographical region of the Iranian and Islamic civilisation and includes Central Asia and China’s Xinxiang while its extension covers Hindu Kush mountains all the way to the northern Muslim-dominated part of India and the entire Makran coastline.

Renewed rivalries?

It is through such an approach that India’s plan to invest in Chabahar and China’s plan to invest in Gwadar port, both along the Makran coast, must be taken into consideration and rivalries between the two countries for establishing stronger ties with South Asia and Central Asia with the main focus on Chabahar and Gwadar ports must be taken quite seriously. The fact that Narendra Modi was willing to be the first Indian prime minister to visit Chabahar in his recent trip to Iran cannot be understood without attention to these equations just in the same way that the Chinese president became the country’s first leader to pay a visit to Pakistan’s Gwadar port. So, it would be logical to say that the coast of Makran, which had been forgotten for a long period of time, is now in focus of attention of China and India as regional powers due to various reasons, and this interest may later spread to the new Russia and the US. It is even likely that in the forthcoming decades, the Makran coast would play a much more important role that it is playing today.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (L) meets Iranian Supreme Leader Sayyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei (C) and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani (R) in Tehran, Iran. May 2016. Credit: Iran Review
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi meets Iranian Supreme Leader Sayyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei (C) and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani (R) in Tehran, Iran. May 2016. Credit: Iran Review
From this viewpoint, the Gwadar port along Pakistan’s Balochistan coastline, and Chabahar port along Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan shoreline, which are located at a short distance from each other along the Makran coast, can be used for two different purposes. This means that they can turn into two rival ports and further intensify rivalries between China and India, as emerging regional powers, and between Russia and the US at global level. On the contrary, they can turn into two free trade ports and stimulate economic development of this entire poor region in favour of all countries that are situated in the domain of the Iranian and Islamic culture and civilisation. It is not clear yet which one of these possibilities about future outlook of Gwadar and Chabahar will be realised, but what can be said with more certainty is that the Makran coast, both in Iran and Pakistan, is trying to gradually achieve a position, which will be quite different from its isolated and forgotten past.

Correct and timely understanding of this issue and making coordinated plans accordingly is a necessity, which cannot be neglected. Future national and even security interests call for the Makran coast to be looked upon from a totally new standpoint. As a first step, the name “Sea of Oman,” which lacks any historical origin and is a fake term just in the same way that the “Arabian Gulf” is a fake name for the “Persian Gulf,” should be replaced with “Makran.” In the next stages, Chabahar should be enabled to play its connecting role in order to stimulate trade and economy of southeastern Iranian provinces. It can also play the same role for Afghanistan and Central Asian countries in the future and instead of entering into rivalry with the Gwadar port, join hands with the Gwadar port in order for these two important and strategic ports along the Makran coast to be seen as partners complementing each other.

At any rate, China’s powerful presence in the Gwadar port and India’s willingness for powerful presence in Iran’s Chabahar port have provided both Iran and Pakistan with an exceptional opportunity to take advantage of this presence to boost their national and regional development and connect Central Asia, South Asia, the Arab Middle East and the coasts of Africa along the Indian Ocean in favour of all nations situated in these regions. [size=18]The requisite to take correct and timely advantage of the existing conditions along the Makran coast is partnership, not rivalry. The Makran coast should be looked upon from the viewpoint of its all-out development capacities. Through such an approach, the Gwadar port can turn into future Singapore of the region while Iran’s Chabahar could at least match up to Dubai. If this experience could be implemented with no major obstacles, it would greatly boost convergence among countries in the region.[/size]
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Re: Bases Chinas internacionales - Navales, aereas y combinadas - ubicaciones, infraestructura, notas e imagenes

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 12/7/2017, 9:13 pm

Rogersukoi27 escribió:

Si habia propositos de establecer una base en Dijibouti,  ahora queda claro
que ya iniciaron su construccion, para establecer su base de rehabastecimiento
de su flota internacional que cruce, arribe y se provea de equipo, material y
suministros para su continuo transito hacia operaciones diversas en la zona.
 Los limites de autosuficiencia naval, les dara una trayectoria prolongada
que les permita retomar proyectos, posicionar sus naves de avanzada,
y responder de acuerdo a las evoluciones por surgir en el medio oriente.

Paises Europeos,  sepan que ya llego a quedarse su lejano vecino: CHINA!!!!

China says starts construction of Djibouti military base

Thu Feb 25, 2016 10:53am GMT Print | Single Page [-] Text [+]
BEIJING (Reuters) - China has begun construction of a logistics base in Djibouti, the Ministry of Defence said on Thursday, what the Horn of African country's government calls a military facility that will be China's first overseas.

Last year, China said it was in talks to build what it describes as naval "support facilities" in the Horn of Africa nation, which has fewer than a million people but is striving to become an international shipping hub.

OFICIALMENTE, A PARTIR DE AYER 11 DE JULIO 2017, se define la base de Djibouti, como primera BASE DE SOPORTE MILITAR CHINA, en ese puerto.
Del Puerto de Zhanjiang, partieron naves con personal militar para ser asignado a dicho
puesto, y seran rotados en algunos casos, recibiendo material, equipo y naves para dar apoyo
a sus planes en Africa, asi como respaldar la operacion naviera internacional de esa zona entre otras.
Es evidente que el principal interes de tener presencia en ese pais, es dar respaldo a los intereses
chinos distribuidos internacionalmente.
La evolucion estrategica con equivalencia a una hegemonia selectiva en el orbe, sin duda es
la direccion precisa de China como potencia en desplazamiento elapsado pero seguro.

China Officially Sets Up Its First Overseas Base in Djibouti

China sends military personnel to its new base, designed to support Chinese missions in Africa and the Middle East.

By Charlotte Gao
July 12, 2017

On July 11, China officially dispatched military personnel to set up its first-ever overseas base in Djibouti, the small country in East Africa.

While foreign media call the new facility a “military” base, China instead calls it a “support base,” which “will ensure China’s performance of missions, such as escorting, peace-keeping, and humanitarian aid in Africa and west Asia,” according to Xinhua, China’s news agency.

In the early morning of July 11, China held an official ceremony in the port of Zhanjiang, south China’s Guangdong province. The commander of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Shen Jinlong, “read an order on constructing the base in Djibouti, and conferred military flag on the fleets.” Then Shen ordered, “Set off!” and the ships carrying Chinese military personnel departed the port, reported Xinhua.

In addition to its basic supporting role, the Djibouti base will also perform other functions including “military cooperation, joint exercises, evacuating and protecting overseas Chinese and emergency rescue, as well as jointly maintaining security of international strategic seaways,” said Xinhua.

Regarding China’s reasons for establishing the “support base,” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi explained that it is meant to help “maintain [China’s] growing overseas interests.”

In an annual press conference held during the 12th National People’s Congress held on March 8, 2016, Wang Yi elaborated on China’s construction in Djibouti:

Like any growing powers, China’s interests are constantly expanding overseas. At present, there are 30,000 Chinese enterprises all over the world… An urgent task for China’s diplomacy is to maintain the growing overseas interests. How to maintain? I would like to tell you clearly that China will never go through the expansion path of the traditional powers, nor will China pursue hegemony. We want to explore a path with Chinese characteristics that both follows the trend of the times and is welcomed by all parties.

Thus, “according to the objective needs and in response to the wishes of the related country,” China will establish some necessary facilities, like its support base in Djibouti. “This is not only reasonable, but also in line with international practice,” said Wang Yi.

So far, it seems that the “related country” — Djibouti — does wish for a greater Chinese presence. China has greatly invested in the tiny Horn of African nation, and included Djibouti in its grand “One Belt, One Road” initiative.

According to Aboubaker Omar Hadi, the chairman of Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority, China has already invested nearly $15 billion in Djibouti’s port expansion and related infrastructure development.

Charlotte Gao holds a MA degree in Asian Studies. Her research interests center around East Asian topics. She has worked in the past as a news editor, reporter, and writer for multiple traditional, online, and new media outlets.
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Re: Bases Chinas internacionales - Navales, aereas y combinadas - ubicaciones, infraestructura, notas e imagenes

Mensaje por Von Leunam el 1/8/2017, 6:09 pm

China inaugura su primera base militar en el extranjero

El Ejército de Liberación Popular chino inauguró este martes su primera base naval fuera de su territorio, en Yibuti, un pequeño país situado en el Cuerno de África. Las autoridades chinas describen estas instalaciones como un "centro logístico" que servirá a los efectivos desplegados en el continente, pero el hito refleja también la voluntad de Pekín de desarrollar una flota naval que sea capaz de operar en aguas profundas y defienda los numerosos intereses que el gigante asiático tiene lejos de casa.

Unas 300 personas asistieron a la ceremonia de inauguración del complejo, según informaron los medios estatales. Apenas se conocen detalles sobre el tamaño o el número de efectivos destinados a la base, a más de 7.000 kilómetros de las costas chinas y cuya construcción se acordó a principios de 2016 por los Gobiernos de ambos países. Su propósito, según Pekín, es dar apoyo logístico a los contingentes chinos que participan en varias misiones de Naciones Unidas en la región, principalmente a las tropas que forman parte de los cascos azules en Malí y Sudán del Sur y a las que realizan operaciones contra la piratería en el golfo de Adén y la costa de Somalia. Estados Unidos, Francia y Japón también cuentan con bases militares en este pequeño país africano.

Esta instalación permitirá a China ganar presencia en un enclave estratégico. Yibuti, país fronterizo con Somalia, Etiopía y Eritrea, se sitúa entre el mar Rojo y el golfo de Adén, en una de las rutas marítimas y de abastecimiento de energía más importantes del planeta y esencial para el comercio chino. El gigante asiático, además, es ya el primer socio comercial del continente africano y ha invertido miles de millones de euros en infraestructuras, una de ellas una línea ferroviaria que conecta precisamente Yibuti con Adís Abeba, capital de la vecina Etiopía.

La apertura de esta base está en la línea de la voluntad de Pekín de que su Ejército tenga un mayor protagonismo a escala global. China sostiene que no busca el expansionismo militar ni entrar en carreras armamentísticas, pero Pekín ha endurecido en los últimos años sus reclamaciones territoriales en el mar de la China meridional y ha tenido roces con varios de sus vecinos. El Ejército de Liberación Popular, que precisamente celebra este martes su 90 aniversario —la inauguración oficial de la base en Yibuti se hizo coincidir con la efeméride—, está inmerso en un proceso de modernización cuyo objetivo es reducir las tropas del Ejército de Tierra y dar prioridad a las mejores tecnológicas, a la Fuerza Aérea y a la Marina. Este año Pekín ha presentado su primer portaaviones de fabricación íntegramente nacional.

"China no esconde de que está en el proceso de desarrollar una Marina moderna que pueda operar en mares lejanos, por ejemplo las patrullas antipiratería en el golfo de Adén o en otros lugares como el mar Báltico. China carece de experiencia en aguas profundas, por lo que estos despliegues en el extranjero sirven para acumular conocimientos a base de lecciones aprendidas", asegura Carl Thayer, profesor emérito de la Universidad de New South Wales en Sídney.

El presidente chino, Xi Jinping, aseguró este martes en un discurso para conmemorar el aniversario del Ejército que este "debe ser lo suficientemente valiente para cambiar e innovar". Las Fuerzas Armadas han sido también objetivo de la campaña anticorrupción del líder chino, que ha relevado a numerosos altos mandos desde que llegó al poder y se ha asegurado el control sobre el aún muy poderoso estamento militar. En este sentido, el pasado domingo y tras un desfile militar masivo, Xi —que también es comandante en jefe— llamó al Ejército a acatar "la dirección absoluta" del Partido Comunista chino.

Este martes, tras varios días de homenajes a las Fuerzas Armadas y presumir de músculo militar, Xi lanzó indirectamente una advertencia a las formaciones independentistas en Hong Kong, al partido gobernante en Taiwán y a varios de los países vecinos que cuentan con disputas de soberanía con Pekín: "China ama la paz, pero no dejaremos que ningún grupo de personas, organización o partido político divida ninguna parte del territorio chino".
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Re: Bases Chinas internacionales - Navales, aereas y combinadas - ubicaciones, infraestructura, notas e imagenes

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 26/6/2018, 4:48 pm

Tanto va el cantaro al agua, hasta que se quiebra.
Asi los Chinos, abrieron la puerta para quedarse en territorio de Sri Lanka, como propiedad
China, para instalar el puerto a su medida, y siendo facultados para cobrar los derechos
e impuestos de transito como administradores del puerto, reteniendo el 85%  como
consorcio Chino, y participando solo con el 15% del resto a la aduana de Sri Lanka.

 Lo que estuvieron provocando, fue ir aumentando lineas de credito para desarrollar su
propio puerto,  y al no tener un desempeño productivo, tuvieron que voltear a China
para que les abriera lineas de credito adicionales para tal proposito.
 Al no tener un proyecto viable, los Chinos demandaron a Sri Lanka, que les otorgara la
concesion por 99 años como exclusiva del consorcio Chino, ademas de 50 acres de terreno,
para sus instalaciones, sin juridisccion de autoridad para Sri Lanka.
 Soltaron una buena suma de miles de millones dolares, con la nueva forma de trabajar;
todos los empleados, tecnicos y trabajadores en la construccion y operacion de ese puerto,
seran enviados desde China.

 El mas sensible asunto, es el supuesto impedimento para que los submarinos Chinos
se les permita llegar a dicho puerto. No hay ninguna postura real declarada, mas para
efectos practicos, China podra permitir su reabasto y estancia temporal en dichas instalaciones.
 Ya le pusieron a la INDIA, un cascabel en el sur de su territorio, creando bipresencia de
espias para ambos paises en dicho pais.
 Veremos y diremos lo que sigue una vez que quede operativo el proyecto.

How China got Sri Lanka to cough up a port  

A security guard at the Hambantota Port, run by the Chinese, in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. A New York Times investigation into Sri Lanka’s handover of its Hambantota Port illustrates how China turned an ally’s struggles to its strategic advantage.
A security guard at the Hambantota Port, run by the Chinese, in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. A New York Times investigation into Sri Lanka’s handover of its Hambantota Port illustrates how China turned an ally’s struggles to its strategic advantage.
Published25 JUNE, 2018UPDATED 26 JUNE, 2018

HAMBANTOTA (Sri Lanka) — Every time Sri Lanka's President Mahinda Rajapaksa turned to his Chinese allies for loans and assistance with an ambitious port project, the answer was yes.

Yes, though feasibility studies said the port wouldn't work. Yes, though other frequent lenders like India had refused. Yes, though Sri Lanka's debt was ballooning rapidly under Mr Rajapaksa.

Over years of construction and renegotiation with China Harbor Engineering Company, one of Beijing's largest state-owned enterprises, the Hambantota Port Development Project distinguished itself mostly by failing, as predicted.

With tens of thousands of ships passing by along one of the world's busiest shipping lanes, the port drew only 34 ships in 2012.

And then the port became China's.

Mr Rajapaksa was voted out of office in 2015, but Sri Lanka's new government struggled to make payments on the debt he had taken on. Under heavy pressure and after months of negotiations with the Chinese, the government handed over the port and 15,000 acres of land around it for 99 years in December.

The transfer gave China control of territory just a few hundred miles off the shores of a rival, India, and a strategic foothold along a critical commercial and military waterway.

The case is one of the most vivid examples of China's ambitious use of loans and aid to gain influence around the world — and of its willingness to play hardball to collect.

The debt deal also intensified some of the harshest accusations about Chinese President Xi Jinping's signature Belt and Road Initiative: that the global investment and lending programme amounts to a debt trap for vulnerable countries around the world, fueling corruption and autocratic behaviour in struggling democracies.

Months of interviews with Sri Lankan, Indian, Chinese and Western officials and analysis of documents and agreements stemming from the port project present a stark illustration of how China and the companies under its control ensured their interests in a small country hungry for financing.

• During the 2015 Sri Lankan elections, large payments from the Chinese port construction fund flowed directly to campaign aides and activities for Mr Rajapaksa, who had agreed to Chinese terms at every turn and was seen as an important ally in China's efforts to tilt influence away from India in South Asia. The payments were confirmed by documents and cash checks detailed in a government investigation seen by The New York Times.

• Though Chinese officials and analysts have insisted that China's interest in the Hambantota port is purely commercial, Sri Lankan officials said that from the start, the intelligence and strategic possibilities of the port's location were part of the negotiations.

• Initially moderate terms for lending on the port project became more onerous as Sri Lankan officials asked to renegotiate the timeline and add more financing. And as Sri Lankan officials became desperate to get the debt off their books in recent years, the Chinese demands centred on handing over equity in the port rather than allowing any easing of terms.

• Though the deal erased roughly US$1 billion (S$1.33 billion) in debt for the port project, Sri Lanka is now in more debt to China than ever, as other loans have continued and rates remain much higher than from other international lenders.

Mr Rajapaksa and his aides did not respond to multiple requests for comment, made over several months, for this article. Officials for China Harbor also would not comment.

Estimates by the Sri Lankan Finance Ministry paint a bleak picture: This year, the government is expected to generate US$14.8 billion in revenue, but its scheduled debt repayments, to an array of lenders around the world, come to US$12.3 billion.

"John Adams said infamously that a way to subjugate a country is through either the sword or debt. China has chosen the latter," said Mr Brahma Chellaney, an analyst who often advises the Indian government and is affiliated with the Center for Policy Research, a think tank in New Delhi.

Indian officials, in particular, fear that Sri Lanka is struggling so much that the Chinese government may be able to dangle debt relief in exchange for its military's use of assets like the Hambantota port — though the final lease agreement forbids military activity there without Sri Lanka's invitation.

"The only way to justify the investment in Hambantota is from a national security standpoint — that they will bring the People's Liberation Army in," said Shivshankar Menon, who served as India's foreign secretary and then its national security adviser as the Hambantota port was being built.

China Harbor employees head to work in Colombo, Sri Lanka.   Photo: The New York Times


The relationship between China and Sri Lanka had long been amenable, with Sri Lanka an early recognizer of Mao's Communist government after the Chinese Revolution. But it was during a more recent conflict — Sri Lanka's brutal 26-year civil war with ethnic Tamil separatists — that China became indispensable.

Mr Rajapaksa, who was elected in 2005, presided over the last years of the war, when Sri Lanka became increasingly isolated by accusations of human rights abuses.

Under him, Sri Lanka relied heavily on China for economic support, military equipment and political cover at the United Nations to block potential sanctions.

The war ended in 2009, and as the country emerged from the chaos, Mr Rajapaksa and his family consolidated their hold.

At the height of Mr Rajapaksa's tenure, the president and his three brothers controlled many government ministries and around 80 per cent of total government spending. Governments like China negotiated directly with them.

So when the president began calling for a vast new port development project at Hambantota, his sleepy home district, the few roadblocks in its way proved ineffective.

From the start, officials questioned the wisdom of a second major port, in a country a quarter the size of Britain and with a population of 22 million, when the main port in the capital was thriving and had room to expand.

Feasibility studies commissioned by the government had starkly concluded that a port at Hambantota was not economically viable.

"They approached us for the port at the beginning, and Indian companies said no," said Mr Menon, the former Indian foreign secretary. "It was an economic dud then, and it's an economic dud now."

But Mr Rajapaksa greenlighted the project, then boasted in a news release that he had defied all caution — and that China was on board.

The Sri Lanka Ports Authority began devising what officials believed was a careful, economically sound plan in 2007, according to an official involved in the project.

It called for a limited opening for business in 2010, and for revenue to be coming in before any major expansion.

The first major loan it took on the project came from the Chinese government's Export-Import Bank, or Exim, for US$307 million.

But to obtain the loan, Sri Lanka was required to accept Beijing's preferred company, China Harbor, as the port's builder, according to a United States Embassy cable from the time, leaked to WikiLeaks.

That is a typical demand of China for its projects around the world, rather than allowing an open bidding process.

Across the region, Beijing's government is lending out billions of dollars, being repaid at a premium to hire Chinese companies and thousands of Chinese workers, according to officials across the region.

There were other strings attached to the loan, as well, in a sign that China saw strategic value in the Hambantota port from the beginning.

Mr Nihal Rodrigo, a former Sri Lankan foreign secretary and ambassador to China, said that discussions with Chinese officials at the time made it clear that intelligence sharing was an integral, if not public, part of the deal.

In an interview with The Times, Mr Rodrigo characterized the Chinese line as, "We expect you to let us know who is coming and stopping here."

In later years, Chinese officials and the China Harbor company went to great lengths to keep relations strong with Mr Rajapaksa, who for years had faithfully acquiesced to such terms.

In the final months of Sri Lanka's 2015 election, China's ambassador broke with diplomatic norms and lobbied voters, even caddies at Colombo's premier golf course, to support Mr Rajapaksa over the opposition, which was threatening to tear up economic agreements with the Chinese government.

As the January election inched closer, large payments started to flow towards the President's circle.

At least US$7.6 million was dispensed from China Harbor's account at Standard Chartered Bank to affiliates of Mr Rajapaksa's campaign, according to a document, seen by The Times, from an active internal government investigation.

The document details China Harbor's bank account number — ownership of which was verified — and intelligence gleaned from questioning of the people to whom the checks were made out.

With 10 days to go before polls opened, around US$3.7 million was distributed in checks: US$678,000 to print campaign T-shirts and other promotional material and US$297,000 to buy supporters gifts, including women's saris.

Another US$38,000 was paid to a popular Buddhist monk who was supporting Mr Rajapaksa's electoral bid, while two checks totaling US$1.7 million were delivered by volunteers to Temple Trees, his official residence.

Most of the payments were from a subaccount controlled by China Harbor, named "HPDP Phase 2", shorthand for Hambantota Port Development Project.

Former President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka, centre, at a wedding in Colombo.    Photo: The New York Times


After nearly five years of helter-skelter expansion for China's Belt and Road Initiative across the globe, Chinese officials are quietly trying to take stock of how many deals have been done and what the country's financial exposure might be.

There is no comprehensive picture of that yet, said one Chinese economic policymaker, who like many other officials would speak about Chinese policy only on the condition of anonymity.

Some Chinese officials have become concerned that the nearly institutional graft surrounding such projects represents a liability for China, and raises the bar needed for profitability.

Mr Xi acknowledged the worry in a speech last year, saying, "We will also strengthen international co-operation on anticorruption in order to build the Belt and Road Initiative with integrity."

In Bangladesh, for example, officials said in January that China Harbor would be banned from future contracts over accusations that the company attempted to bribe an official at the ministry of roads, stuffing US$100,000 into a box of tea, government officials said in interviews.

And China Harbor's parent company, China Communications Construction Company, was banned for eight years in 2009 from bidding on World Bank projects because of corrupt practices in the Philippines.

Since the port seizure in Sri Lanka, Chinese officials have started suggesting that Belt and Road is not an open-ended government commitment to finance development across three continents.

"If we cannot manage the risk well, the Belt and Road projects cannot go far or well," said Ms Jin Qi, the chairwoman of the Silk Road Fund, a large state-owned investment fund, during the China Development Forum in late March.

In Sri Lanka's case, port officials and Chinese analysts have also not given up the view that the Hambantota port could become profitable, or at least strengthen China's trade capacity in the region.

Mr Ray Ren, China Merchant Port's representative in Sri Lanka and the head of the Hambantota port's operations, insisted that "the location of Sri Lanka is ideal for international trade."

And he dismissed the negative feasibility studies, saying they were done many years ago when Hambantota was "a small fishing hamlet".

Mr Hu Shisheng, the director of South Asia studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, said that China clearly recognised the strategic value of the Hambantota port.

But he added: "Once China wants to exert its geostrategic value, the strategic value of the port will be gone. Big countries cannot fight in Sri Lanka — it would be wiped out."

Although the Hambantota port first opened in a limited way in 2010, before the Belt and Road Initiative was announced, the Chinese government quickly folded the project into the global programme.

Shortly after the handover ceremony in Hambantota, China's state news agency released a boastful video on Twitter, proclaiming the deal "another milestone along the path of #BeltandRoad."

Chinese construction workers, bottom left, walk home from their jobs in Colombo.   Photo: The New York Times.

The seaport is not the only grand project built with Chinese loans in Hambantota, a sparsely populated area on Sri Lanka's southeastern coast that is still largely overrun by jungle.

A cricket stadium with more seats than the population of Hambantota's district capital marks the skyline, as does a large international airport — which in June lost the only daily commercial flight it had left when FlyDubai airline ended the route.

A highway that cuts through the district is traversed by elephants and used by farmers to rake out and dry the rice plucked fresh from their paddies.

Mr Rajapaksa's advisers had laid out a methodical approach to how the port might expand after opening, ensuring that some revenue would be coming in before taking on much more debt.

But in 2009, the president had grown impatient. His 65th birthday was approaching the following year, and to mark the occasion he wanted a grand opening at the Hambantota port — including the beginning of an ambitious expansion 10 years ahead of the Port Authority's original timeline.

Chinese labourers began working day and night to get the port ready, officials said.

But when workers dredged the land and then flooded it to create the basin of the port, they had not taken into account a large boulder that partly blocked the entrance, preventing the entry of large ships, like oil tankers, that the port's business model relied on.

Ports Authority officials, unwilling to cross the president, quickly moved ahead anyway. The Hambantota port opened in an elaborate celebration on Nov. 18, 2010, Mr Rajapaksa's birthday. Then it sat waiting for business while the rock blocked it.

China Harbor blasted the boulder a year later, at a cost of US$40 million, an exorbitant price that raised concerns among diplomats and government officials.

Some openly speculated about whether the company was simply overcharging or the price tag included kickbacks to Mr Rajapaksa.

By 2012, the port was struggling to attract ships — which preferred to berth nearby at the Colombo port — and construction costs were rising as the port began expanding ahead of schedule.

The government decreed later that year that ships carrying car imports bound for Colombo port would instead offload their cargo at Hambantota to kick-start business there.

Still, only 34 ships berthed at Hambantota in 2012, compared with 3,667 ships at the Colombo port, according to a Finance Ministry annual report.

"When I came to the government, I called the minister of national planning and asked for the justification of Hambantota Port," Mr Harsha de Silva, the state minister for national policies and economic affairs, said in an interview. "She said, 'We were asked to do it, so we did it.' "

Determined to keep expanding the port, Mr Rajapaksa went back to the Chinese government in 2012, asking for US$757 million.

The Chinese agreed again. But this time, the terms were much steeper.

The first loan, at US$307 million, had originally come at a variable rate that usually settled above 1 per cent or 2 per cent after the global financial crash in 2008. (For comparison, rates on similar Japanese loans for infrastructure projects run below half a per cent.)

But to secure fresh funding, that initial loan was renegotiated to a much higher 6.3 per cent fixed rate. Mr Rajapaksa acquiesced.

The rising debt and project costs, even as the port was struggling, handed Sri Lanka's political opposition a powerful issue, and it campaigned heavily on suspicions about China. Mr Rajapaksa lost the election.

The incoming government, led by President Maithripala Sirisena, came to office with a mandate to scrutinize Sri Lanka's financial deals.

It also faced a daunting amount of debt: Under Mr Rajapaksa, the country's debt had increased threefold, to US$44.8 billion when he left office. And for 2015 alone, a US$4.68 billion payment was due at year's end.

A view of the Colombo Port City development in Colombo.    Photo: The New York Times


The new government was eager to reorient Sri Lanka toward India, Japan and the West. But officials soon realised that no other country could fill the financial or economic space that China held in Sri Lanka.

"We inherited a purposefully run-down economy — the revenues were insufficient to pay the interest charges, let alone capital repayment," said Ravi Karunanayake, who was finance minister during the new government's first year in office.

"We did keep taking loans," he added. "A new government can't just stop loans. It's a relay; you need to take them until economic discipline is introduced."

The Central Bank estimated that Sri Lanka owed China about US$3 billion last year.

But Mr Nishan de Mel, an economist at Verite Research, said some of the debts were off government books and instead registered as part of individual projects.

He estimated that debt owed to China could be as much as US$5 billion and was growing every year.

In May, Sri Lanka took a new US$1 billion loan from China Development Bank to help make its coming debt payment.

Government officials began meeting in 2016 with their Chinese counterparts to strike a deal, hoping to get the port off Sri Lanka's balance sheet and avoid outright default.

But the Chinese demanded that a Chinese company take a dominant equity share in the port in return, Sri Lankan officials say — writing down the debt was not an option China would accept.

When Sri Lanka was given a choice, it was over which state-owned company would take control: either China Harbor or China Merchants Port, according to the final agreement, a copy of which was obtained by The Times, although it was never released publicly in full.

China Merchants got the contract, and it immediately pressed for more: Company officials demanded 15,000 acres of land around the port to build an industrial zone, according to two officials with knowledge of the negotiations.

The Chinese company argued that the port itself was not worth the US$1.1 billion it would pay for its equity — money that would close out Sri Lanka's debt on the port.

Some government officials bitterly opposed the terms, but there was no leeway, according to officials involved in the negotiations.

The new agreement was signed in July 2017, and took effect in December.

The deal left some appearance of Sri Lankan ownership: Among other things, it created a joint company to manage the port's operations and collect revenue, with 85 per cent owned by China Merchants Port and the remaining 15 per cent controlled by Sri Lanka's government.

But lawyers specialising in port acquisitions said Sri Lanka's small stake meant little, given the leverage that China Merchants Port retained over board personnel and operating decisions. And the government holds no sovereignty over the port's land.

When the agreement was initially negotiated, it left open whether the port and surrounding land could be used by the Chinese military, which Indian officials asked the Sri Lankan government to explicitly forbid.

The final agreement bars foreign countries from using the port for military purposes unless granted permission by the government in Colombo.

That clause is there because Chinese Navy submarines had already come calling to Sri Lanka.


China had a stake in Sri Lanka's main port as well: China Harbor was building a new terminal there, known at the time as Colombo Port City.

Along with that deal came roughly 50 acres of land, solely held by the Chinese company, that Sri Lanka had no sovereignty on.

That was dramatically demonstrated toward the end of Mr Rajapaksa's term, in 2014.

Chinese submarines docked at the harbour the same day that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan was visiting Colombo, in what was seen across the region as a menacing signal from Beijing.

When the new Sri Lankan government came to office, it sought assurances that the port would never again welcome Chinese submarines — of particular concern because they are difficult to detect and often used for intelligence gathering. But Sri Lankan officials had little real control.

Now, the handover of Hambantota to the Chinese has kept alive concerns about possible military use — particularly as China has continued to militarise island holdings around the South China Sea despite earlier pledges not to.

Sri Lankan officials are quick to point out that the agreement explicitly rules out China's military use of the site.

But others also note that Sri Lanka's government, still heavily indebted to China, could be pressured to allow it.

And, as Mr de Silva, the state minister for national policies and economic affairs, put it, "Governments can change."

Now, he and others are watching carefully as Mr Rajapaksa, China's preferred partner in Sri Lanka, has been trying to stage a political comeback.

The former president's new opposition party swept municipal elections in February. Presidential elections are coming up next year, and general elections in 2020.

Although Mr Rajapaksa is barred from running again because of term limits, his brother Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the former defence secretary, appears to be readying to take the mantle.

"It will be Mahinda Rajapaksa's call. If he says it's one of the brothers, that person will have a very strong claim," said Mr Ajith Nivard Cabraal, the central bank governor under Mr Rajapaksa's government, who still advises the family.

"Even if he's no longer the president, as the Constitution is structured, Mahinda will be the main power base." THE NEW YORK TIMES
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China intensifica su relación militar con África

Una nueva señal de la enorme implicación de China en África. Este martes ha comenzado el primer foro de cooperación sobre defensa y seguridad entre la segunda potencia económica mundial y la región. Un encuentro que se prolongará hasta el 10 de julio que pone de relieve la presencia cada vez mayor de China en África y el creciente papel del gigante asiático como protagonista en un escenario mundial donde Estados Unidos está haciendo mutis por el foro.

El evento inaugurado este martes, según el portavoz del Ministerio de Defensa Ren Guoqiang, servirá para “profundizar la asociación estratégica, promover un futuro compartido y responder a las necesidades de seguridad y defensa de África”. O, en otras palabras, abordar cuestiones de seguridad regional, contribuir a la mejora de las fuerzas militares de la región y transmitir una imagen de China como potencia.

Los participantes podrán visitar instalaciones de las fuerzas de tierra, mar y aire chinas: una exhibición de músculo que demuestre cómo se ha modernizado el Ejército Popular de Liberación y promocione su armamento. Un armamento cuyas ventas a África han crecido un 55% desde el nombramiento de Xi Jinping al frente del país en 2013, según el Instituto Internacional de Estocolmo para la Investigación sobre la Paz (SIPRI). En 2015 era ya el segundo proveedor de armas al África subsahariana, solo por detrás de Rusia.

Precisamente la reunión ocurre cuando llega a Pekín para una visita de tres días el secretario de Defensa de Estados Unidos, Jim Mattis. Su presidente, Donald Trump, que describió en enero a naciones africanas como “países de mierda”, aún tiene pendiente de nombrar un secretario de Estado adjunto para asuntos africanos —Donald Yamamoto está en funciones— y varios embajadores.

Si la desidia, en el mejor de los casos, es el tono que África percibe desde la Casa Blanca, con la única excepción de la lucha antiterrorista, desde el otro extremo del mundo el mensaje no puede ser más diferente. Todo son cortejos. Acaba de concluir un foro chino-africano sobre infraestructuras en Kenia. El presidente chino, Xi Jinping, tiene prevista una gira por el continente este julio. En septiembre, China acogerá una nueva edición del foro de cooperación China-África (FOCAC), que ha elevado a categoría de cumbre. El país asiático es el principal socio comercial del continente.

En el terreno militar, ese interés es palpable. Ya en 2008, envió al golfo de Adén su primer contingente fuera de Asia-Pacífico, para participar en la fuerza internacional contra la piratería. La primera base militar de China en el extranjero, inaugurada en agosto del año pasado, se encuentra en Yibuti, en el Cuerno de África. Pekín también participa activamente, con aportaciones económicas y de tropas, en misiones de paz en el continente: es el principal contribuyente entre los cinco miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad, y se encuentra entre los doce primeros de todo el mundo. Mantiene 2.400 soldados en siete operaciones de paz en el continente. También ha ofrecido equipar a fuerzas de paz africanas.

El Ejército chino "se ha establecido como un socio activo en materia de seguridad, mediante contactos militares basados en programas de formación y adiestramiento, asesores militares, ventas de armas y construcción de instalaciones militares, así como sedes del Ministerio de Defensa", apunta el Centro Africano de Estudios Estratégicos.

“China está cada vez más involucrada en temas de seguridad y defensa en África”, apunta Helena Legarda, investigadora asociada del centro de estudios alemán MERICS. Una de las razones es “la necesidad de proteger los intereses de China en la región, incluyendo el acceso a recursos naturales y rutas comerciales, y la protección de las empresas chinas con operaciones en África y los trabajadores y ciudadanos chinos en el continente” ante posibles ataques terroristas o inestabilidad política. En parte, recuerda, China estableció su base en Yibuti para la lucha contra la piratería en el golfo de Adén, que amenazaba las conexiones marítimas de su Nueva Ruta de la Seda, la ambiciosa red de infraestructuras por todo el mundo que Pekín considera su gran prioridad.

Cerca de 10.000 empresas chinas operan en África, y se calcula que un 12% de la producción industrial del continente está gestionado por estas firmas. Más de un millón de inmigrantes chinos se han instalado en el continente. El intercambio comercial ronda los 150.000 millones de dólares (unos 130.000 millones de euros).

Esa protección de sus intereses, opina, tendrá cada vez más relevancia: la Nueva Ruta de la Seda impulsa a cada vez más compañías de esta nacionalidad a salir al extranjero. En parte, recuerda, China estableció su base en Yibuti para la lucha contra la piratería en el golfo de Adén, que amenazaba las conexiones marítimas de su Nueva Ruta de la Seda. Aporta tropas a las misiones de la ONU en Sudán del Sur —donde cuenta con intereses petroleros—, República Democrática de Congo —que le suministra cobre y cobalto— y Malí, azotado por el terrorismo islámico.

Pero, apunta Legarda, la implicación en asuntos de seguridad en África “es también un intento de mejorar la imagen de China en el ámbito internacional, demostrando que China es un actor responsable y que se involucra en iniciativas multilaterales para el mantenimiento de la paz regional y mundial”. Ante la retirada de EE UU de muchos de sus compromisos internacionales bajo el mandato de Trump, y una Europa pendiente de sus crisis internas, “China ve ahora una oportunidad para aumentar su influencia en África e internacionalmente”, sostiene.

De momento, los primeros roces entre EE UU y China en Yibuti —donde Estados Unidos y otras potencias también cuenta con una base— ya han empezado a surgir, en un eco de las tensiones más generalizadas entre las dos potencias, en especial en el mar del sur de China. Esta primavera, Washington se quejó formalmente a Pekín después de varios incidentes en ese país en los que la visión de sus pilotos se vio afectada por láseres muy potentes procedentes, según ellos, de la base china.

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