Este es un foro dedicado a las Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas así como de los diferentes Cuerpos de Policía y demás entes que se dedican a la Seguridad interna de México.

Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

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Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 21/2/2015, 7:32 pm

Con una variada lista de planes de accion, el Japon, sigue preparando las herramientas,
y las estrategias que le permitan responder a las fuerzas armadas Chinas, en el caso
de una accion militar evidente, e instrumentos adecuados para retener sus represalias.
Algunas ya efectivas, son las entrenadas y efectivas fuerzas japonesas de submarinos,
acompañados de equipos en reemplazo de naves de deteccion submarina china y con
capacidad de ataque antisubmarino desde el aire, al igual que las barreras de territorio
aereo/maritimo similares a las impuestas por China, para darle seguridad a sus costas
y lineas territoriales soberanas. No se le resta merito a la preparacion de flotas de
anti-minas en sus zonas de protuberancias e islas niponas, de equipos anti-misiles en
costas y abordo de Naves, con sistemas de radares y satelites de ubicacion y seleccion
de objetivos, asi como el incremento de flota de Portahelos y su tecnologia AEGIS de
avanzada actualizacion en sus opcion 9. Otras evoluciones en proceso siguen avanzando,
mas el sigilo de su gobierno actual, impide que se publique todo su arsenal en desarrollo.

This is Japan’s Best Strategy to Defeat China at Sea

In order to win, Japan should give China a dose of its own medicine.

By Franz-Stefan Gady
February 20, 2015

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is a highly capable navy, although it is the smallest of Japan’s military branches. It is technologically more advanced, more experienced, and more highly trained than its main competitor – the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Yet, in the long-run, the JMSDF and the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) – Tokyo’s principle enforcer of maritime law – are at a relative disadvantage if one looks at the bourgeoning naval rearmament program of China, which is gradually shifting the regional maritime balance in Beijing’s favor.

“From a military perspective, Tokyo is becoming the weaker party in the Sino-Japanese rivalry,” argues Naval War College professor Toshi Yoshihara, in a 2014 report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). “Japan (…) finds itself squeezed between China’s latent military prowess that backs up Chinese coercion over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and China’s ability to disrupt access to the global commons should conventional deterrence fail,” he further notes.

According to the Institute of International Strategic Studies, China’s share of regional military expenditure rose from 28 percent in 2010 to 38 percent in 2014 totaling $129.4 billion. In contrast, in Japan, despite fears of resurgent militarism under Shinzo Abe, regional share of expenditure fell from 20 percent in 2010 to less than 14 percent in 2014, leaving Tokyo’s defense budget at $47.7 billion.

Given Tokyo’s apparent relative decline in military strengths what is the JMSDF’s best strategy for confronting China in the years ahead?

According to Toshi Yoshihara, it is an anti-access operational concept with Japanese characteristics. In short, Japan should give China a dose of its own medicine and emulate the PLAN’s alleged anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy (although there is little actual evidence that the Chinese Navy is placing a high priority on such a strategy. See: “The One Article to Read on Chinese Naval Strategy in 2015”). An A2/AD operational concept with Japanese characteristics would take into account Japan’s role as a gatekeeper to the open waters of the Pacific and would center around exploiting Japan’s maritime geographical advantage over China by skillfully deploying the JMSDF along the Ryukyu Islands chain, bottling up the PLAN in the East China Sea until the U.S. Navy and other allied navies can deploy in full-strength.

The short-term operational goal would be to create a military stalemate, until superior allied forces could be brought to bear. “While the Ryukyus fall well inside the PLA’s antiaccess zone, the archipelago’s strategic location offers Japan a chance to turn the tables on China. By deploying anti-access and area-denial units along the islands, Japanese defenders could slam shut an important outlet for Chinese surface, submarine and air forces into the Pacific high seas,” Toshi Yoshihara notes.

Bernard D. Cole, in his book, Asian Maritime Strategies – Navigating Troubled Waters, argues that “although not formally promulgated,” Japan is “essentially” already for all intents and purposes pursuing an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy – albeit not a comprehensive one, given the current much broader mission set of the JMSDF. The linchpin of Tokyo’s A2/AD strategy is undersea warfare, which promises to be an effective A2/AD tool given the PLAN’s poor anti-submarine warfare capabilities as outlined in a recent RAND report on Chinese military weaknesses.

Submarines are the JMSDF’s capital ships. In 2010, the Japanese Navy announced that it would increase its submarine fleet from 16 to 22 ships. The backbone of the new fleet will be ten Soryu-class diesel-electric attack submarines, five of which are already in service, with the rest commissioned by 2019. The Soryus are among the biggest and most technologically advanced diesel submarines in the world. The JMSDF also continues to operate 11 Oyashio-class diesel-electric class submarines.

“To patrol the waters along southwestern Japan, it is estimated that at least eight submarines are necessary (six for the Okinawa island chain and two for the Bashi Channel). Typically, a boat requires two backups for training and maintenance. Thus a submarine fleet of 24 is ideal, but a fleet of 22 provides more operational flexibility than the current fleet of 16,” summarizes Tetsuo Kotani, a senior research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, in a 2014 paper on the U.S.-Japan allied maritime strategy, the rationale behind Japan’s submarine buildup. Kotani also supports an A2/AD strategy with Japanese characteristics: “To deter Chinese aggression, Japan and the United States should maintain sea-denial capabilities inside the first island chain and sea control beyond the first island chain.”

There are indications that Japan is tacitly pursuing an A2/AD strategy. Two new Izumo-class helicopter destroyers (22DDH) with 20,000 tons full-load displacement, and capable of carrying 15 helicopters, will enhance the JMSDF anti-submarine warfare and border-area surveillance capabilities, and could also be used to quickly ferry troops (e.g., anti-ship and anti-air missile units) to the Ryukyu Islands. In addition, Tokyo plans to add 20 Kawasaki P-1 maritime patrol aircraft, capable of conducting anti-submarine warfare, to its naval arsenal. By the end of fiscal year 2020, the JMSDF also plans to double the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers from four to eight, with the possibility of adding two more past 2020. The destroyers will boost the JMSDF’s anti-air-warfare capability – a crucial component of any A2/AD strategy.

Additionally, the JMSDF plans to add at least two more ships to its already existing fleet of 27 mine-warfare vessels. Japan possesses a very large inventory of sophisticated anti-ship mines, some of which are specifically designed to target vessels passing through narrow seas. Japan’s 2012 Defense White Paper specifically talks about “mine deployment warfare”. “[T]he Japanese mine threat would be very challenging to China in times of hostilities. Chinese minesweeping units and associated escorts would have to cross several hundred kilometers of hotly contested waters and airspace to reach the Ryukyus,” elaborates Toshi Yoshihara. Fast-attack boats (e.g., the Hayabusa-class guided-missile patrol boat), hiding behind occupied islands and stealthily launching anti-ship missiles, could make matters even worse for the PLAN, should Chinese naval forces attempt a breakthrough.

The big question is whether the Chinese PLAN constitutes such a threat to Japan that it would justify the JMSDF pulling all resources into implementing a comprehensive “Anti-PLAN A2/AD Strategy.” As of now, the answer is clearly no. While an A2/AD cost-imposing strategy may deter the PLAN from trying to break out of the East China Sea bottleneck in times of war, it will do very little to help alleviate other maritime issues such as settling “gray-zone disputes” (e.g., the ongoing conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands), stemming the North Korean threat, or fulfilling the JMSDFs mission to defend regional sea lines of communication (the Tokyo, Guam, Taiwan triangle), which, in fact, is Tokyo’s responsibility under the mutual defense treaty with the United States – the cornerstone of the country’s security.

Defending regional sea lines of communications necessitates a broader set of skills than is needed for an A2/AD strategy and “requires proficiency across the spectrum of both coast-guard and naval missions, from surveillance to defense against ballistic missiles,” according to Bernard D. Cole. Unless, Japan’s defense budget will rise substantially, compromises will have to be made. Yet, with seaborne shipping carrying 99.7 percent of Japan’s overall trade, Japan cannot compromise over a well-balanced and adaptable maritime strategy — it is an absolute necessity for the country. It has to be a fox rather than a hedgehog, to use Isaiah Berlin’s analogy when analyzing Tolstoi, for ”the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.”

Consequently, while Japan is currently tacitly pursuing a partial A2/AD strategy, it needs to balance the Chinese naval threat with other emerging threats and the multiple maritime responsibilities of a regional great power. It follows that although a comprehensive “Anti-PLAN A2/AD Strategy” may be the fastest way to victory in a military confrontation with China, it is unlikely that we will see a major change in Japan’s maritime strategy in the near-term future.


Considerando la variedad de temas y puntos en desarrollo de las Fuerzas Armadas de Japon,
solicito se cree tema (FUERZAS ARMADAS DE JAPON)para reacomodar estos temas estrategicos militares de dicho pais,
por lo frecuente de eventos, contratos, acuerdos y maniobras con sus diferentes frentesde la Naval, Fuerza Aerea y las fuerzas terrestres.
Agradezco su aprobacion a la solicitud propuesta.

Un atento saludo!

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Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 23/2/2015, 1:58 pm

Para no andar por las ramas, La siguiente declaracion a la prensa por parte del
Secretario de Defensa Japones General Nakatani, que se inician las operaciones
de vigilancia aerea hasta la zona Sur del mar de China, como labor de inspeccion
y apoyo a las naciones hermanas que se ven afectadas por los desarrollos Chinos
en la zona en conflicto internacional, por pertenecer a las zonas economicas exclusivas
de sus vecinos (Filipinas, Vietnam Indonesia), para lo cual a partir del 4 de Febrero
del presente, se ha iniciado la extension de vigilancia por las naves aereas japonesas.
Esta informacion, es la mas clara declaratoria de ejecutar planes de avanzada
para estar preparados en los movimientos logisticos navales de China.
En pocas palabras, calentando el mar del Sur de China con su presencia aerea
de momento.(No indica si maniobras submarinas surten efecto en dicha zona tambien.)

Japan to Mull Expanding Navy Patrols to South China Sea

by Andy SharpTing Shi
6:53 PM PST
February 3, 2015

(Bloomberg) -- The Japanese government said it would consider conducting air and sea patrols in the South China Sea, a move that would risk fresh tensions with China as its neighbor steps up its military presence in the region.
#99ff33]]“The interdependence of nations is increasing and deepening, and the situation in the South China Sea affects our national security,” Defense Minister Gen Nakatani told reporters Tuesday in Tokyo. “The way our nation handles this will be an issue going forward,” he said[/size], adding that Japan has no specific plans at the moment to start patrols.
Nakatani was responding to a question about comments made last week by Vice-Admiral Robert Thomas, commander of the Navy Seventh Fleet, who said the U.S. would welcome an extension of air patrols into the South China Sea to counter the growing number of Chinese vessels pushing the country’s territorial claims.
Japan’s regular patrols currently extend to waters around its borders and take in the East China Sea, where Japan is embroiled in a dispute with China over the sovereignty of a tiny island chain. The potential extension of surveillance would be just one point of discussion as Japan and the U.S. work to finalize a revision of guidelines for defense cooperation in the first half of this year.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying last week warned against outside interference in the South China Sea, without specifically referring to Japan.
“We are willing to and able to jointly uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea,” Hua told reporters in Beijing in response to a question about Thomas’s comments. “Countries outside the region should respect the endeavor of countries in the region to safeguard peace and stability, and refrain from sowing discord among other countries and creating tensions.”
Maritime Power
Chinese President Xi Jinping has sought to extend China’s reach since coming to power in November 2012. The Communist Party leadership has stated that making China a maritime power is a national goal. China is also developing a more combat-ready military and long-range capacity to bolster its claims to a large part of the South China Sea.
Tensions have risen in recent years between China and other claimant countries, especially the Philippines and Vietnam. The Philippines has submitted its territorial case to international arbitration.
China has already extended naval patrols to cover most of the South China Sea, according to state media reports. The government in Beijing has repeatedly denied it will set up an air defense zone over the area.
China is also embroiled in a dispute with Japan over the sovereignty of the East China Sea islands, known as Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese. Japan’s purchase of the islands in September 2012 sparked demonstrations in China and attacks against Japanese companies. Encounters between ships and planes from the two countries have raised the potential for a confrontation.
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Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 8/3/2015, 8:10 pm

Aunque las fechas de las propuestas no conicidan, la postura inicial del Premier jAPONES
de establecer la alianza estrategia del DIAMANTE, incluyendo a Japon, E.U. Australia inicialmente,
con una gran posibilidad de incorporar como soporte estrategico de la India por su presencia
en el Oceano Indico, (este ultimo se ve indeciso ante China y E.U.), le estan buscando tener
los arreglos de naves, aviones, submarinos y sistemas entrelazados para tener la red de
desarrollo de posiciones, acciones y ejercicios conjuntos ante la eminente presencia
geoestrategica de la Flota naval China en diferentes escenarios.
Veremos el desenlace estos integrantes en la siguiente jugada, (no estan incorporando a
Taiwan, Filipinas, Vietnam ni Malasia en esta posicion de seguridad estrategica).

Japan’s “Asian Security Diamond” Strategic Concept Reviewed

Paper No. 5770 Dated 19-Aug-2014

By Dr Subhash Kapila

Japan’s “Asian Security Diamond” strategic concept is the brainchild of Japan’s present Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as a strategic response to China casting menacing maritime shadows over the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.

The “Asian Security Diamond” strategic concept was unveiled byPM Shinzo Abe as he assumed office for the second time as Japan’s Prime Minister last year. Earlier, in his first term as Japan’s Prime Minister on a visit to India addressing the In dian Parliament in June 2007, PM Abe spoke of the “Confluence of Two Seas” alluding that the security and safety of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean were indivisible and that Japan and India should take the lead in conjunction with other like-minded nations to ensure the maritime security of what is now being referred jointly as Indo Pacific Asia.

The “Asian Security Diamond” strategic concept as spelt out last year envisaged a strategic coalition of Australia, India, Japan and the US State of Hawaii to safeguard the maritime commons extending from the Indian Ocean and extending to the entire Western Pacific.

PM Shinzo Abe had asserted that “The ongoing disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea mean that Japan’s top foreign policy priority must be to expand the country’s strategic horizons. Japan is a mature maritime democracy and choice of close partners should reflect that fact. I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US State of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons starting from the Indian Ocean Region to the Western Pacific. I am prepared to invest the greatest possible extent, Japan’s capabilities in the security diamond”

That is why initially the stress was on Asia’s “Democratic Security Diamond” implying emphasis on democracies like Japan. Japan’s unequivocal commitment to this strategic coalition needs to be noted and can be expected to pursue the Asian Strategic Diamond concept with full vigour.

While reviewing this concept, the questions that need to be examined are as follows:

Why the emphasis on ‘like-minded democracies’?
Should not the “Asian Security Diamond” strategic concept be enlarged?
The strategic inclinations of countries named by the Japanese Prime Minister in his original grouping. Need examination. How receptive are they to the strategic concept advocated?
Before further examination of the above issues, two facts need to be highlighted and those are that the “Asian Security Diamond” concept is strategically conceived for checkmating the unrestrained rampage of a military aggressive China in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. China seeks full dominance over the entire Western Pacific in terms of maritime navigation and also air flights over the two Seas as evidenced by China’s declaration of ADIZ over the East China Sea.

Secondly, it is obvious that the Asian Security Diamond has the full backing of the United States even as it attempts strategically engaging China as leverage against Russia.

Now the first issue stated above of the Asian Security Diamond being restricted to like-minded democracies I would recommend that by doing so a strategic concept with a very topical objective would get reduced to ideological contours and would detract from its intended aim. It possibly would enable China which is bereft of “natural allies” presently, to enlist some partners. Even if the preceding is discounted the Asian Security Diamond strategic concept would avoidably be diluted.

With the above background it would be logical to invite all nations of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean region threatened /materially affected by China’s strategy of establishing a maritime hegemony in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean region. The enlarged strategic grouping of an expanded Asian Security Diamond should include countries like South Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore besides those nations originally spelt out by PM Abe.

Moving to the strategic inclinations of nations originally spelt out by PM Abe, it can safely be stated that Australia, Japan and the United States would be fully inclined to join such a strategic grouping.

The strategic inclinations of India as the most powerful nation in the Indian Ocean however are ambivalent. While it is drawn towards reinforcing its strategic partnership with Japan and has been participating in Japan-India-US joint naval exercises in the Pacific Ocean and also taking part in Trilateral and Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogues including Australia, perceptively it may shy away from actively joining the Asian Security Diamond. The trouble with India is that it follows a hedging strategy when it comes to China and shirks away from any initiative that would suggest that it is inclined towards any China-containment grouping.

However with a new, bold and assertive Prime Minister in the persona of PM Narendra Modi, it is sincerely hoped that India would shed its debilitating strategic ambiguities generated by an unwarranted deference to China’s strategic sensitivities.

Indian policy makers if persisting with such erstwhile and old policy mind-sets would make India lose out in terms of acquiring strategic leverages in its dealings with an aggressive China.

In this connection, one would like to draw the attention of the Indian policy establishment to statements by the previous Indian Defence Minister and Indian Prime Minister asserting that India is well placed to be a ‘nett provider’ of security in the Indian Ocean region.

As far as the South East Asian countries directly affected by China’s aggressive brinkmanship and armed aggression in the South China Sea like Vietnam and the Philippines are concerned they can expectedly be inclined to join the Asian Security Diamond. Both these nations are being actively being assisted presently by Japan in the capacity building of their naval capabilities.

As China has already started attempting to dominate the Southern Segment of the South China Sea, one could expect that remainder ASEAN disputants and even non-disputants would get induced to join the Asian Security Diamond.

In fact Japanese Prime Minister Abe has now resorted to a political and strategic reachout to France and United Kingdom, that they too should also join the Asian Security Diamond as both these nations have significant strategic, political and economic stakes in the Indian Ocean Region and also the Western Pacific

It needs to be remembered that both France and the United Kingdom have a regular naval presence in the Indian Ocean. At various Shangri-La Dialogues each year they have reiterated their intentions to be active stake-holders in Indo Pacific Asia security and stability.

Concluding, it needs to be reiterated that the Asia Security Diamond strategic concept is a proposition whose time has strategically come when contextually viewed against the Chinese strategy of establishing its hegemony over the vast maritime expanses of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region. A wide strategic convergence exists in the region for some sort of strategic coalition as opposed to a military alliance, to off-set the Chinese challenge

The China Threat is palpably being felt in Asian capitals and these nations perceptively seem inclined to join in a strategically collaborative initiative like the Asian Security Diamond and where the lead is being given by an Asian Power like Japan, the Asian Security Diamond strategic concept would find more resonance and acceptability.

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Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Von Leunam el 18/3/2015, 12:55 pm

Japón da un paso adelante para aplicar su nueva doctrina militar

Japón ha dado hoy miércoles un paso adelante más para poner en marcha el mayor cambio en el funcionamiento de sus fuerzas armadas en los últimos 60 años. Un acuerdo marco entre los dos partidos de la coalición de Gobierno, el Partido Liberal Demócrata (PLD) de Shinzo Abe y Komeito, sienta las bases para actualizar las líneas maestras de la colaboración con Estados Unidos en materia de Defensa y para que las fuerzas niponas puedan asistir a aliados en peligro, el llamado “principio de autodefensa colectiva”.

El Gobierno de Abe aprobó el año pasado una reinterpretación de la Constitución pacifista nipona, creada tras la II Guerra Mundial, para permitir que las Fuerzas de Autodefensa japonesas pudieran participar bajo determinadas circunstancias en acciones fuera de su territorio para auxiliar a aliados en peligro.

El acuerdo al que han llegado hoy miércoles los dos socios de gobierno permite que esa reinterpretación pueda comenzar a ponerse en práctica, mediante legislación que se presentará a los diputados nipones posiblemente en mayo. Dado que el PLD y Komeito suman una mayoría absoluta en la Cámara baja, está fuera de toda duda que ese proyecto de ley saldrá adelante.

La reinterpretación se incorporará también a las nuevas guías que regirán la alianza militar entre EE UU y Japón, en su primera actualización desde 1997. Estas líneas maestras podrían presentarse públicamente en una reunión de los responsables de Defensa y de Exteriores de ambos países en abril, previa a la visita de Abe a Washington.

Según publica el diario The Japan Times, el acuerdo marco entre el conservador PLD y Komeito —más moderado— prevé “una expansión de las actividades de las Fuerzas de Autodefensa en varias áreas”.

Entre otras cosas, indica este diario, se simplificará el procedimiento para enviar tropas al exterior en misiones humanitarias. Será necesario el visto bueno del Parlamento, y las fuerzas tendrán que actuar respaldadas con un mandato de Naciones Unidas, pero el Gobierno ya no tendrá que aprobar una ley extraordinaria con un plazo fijo de vigencia para cada caso, como ocurría hasta ahora.

La reinterpretación de la Constitución aprobada por el Gobierno el 1 de julio de 2014 permite que Japón pueda recurrir al uso de la fuerza —si bien en el mínimo nivel posible— si un país aliado sufre un ataque y si se cumplen una serie de condiciones. Entre ellas, la falta de otra alternativa o que ese ataque represente una amenaza contra la existencia de Japón.

Según apunta The Japan Times, el acuerdo marco entre el PLD y Komeito prevé que las fuerzas japonesas puedan participar en más misiones de inspección de buques. Hasta ahora, las Fuerzas de Autodefensa solo pueden participar en este tipo de operaciones en aguas japonesas o adyacentes.

El pacto, que los dos partidos tienen previsto suscribir formalmente este viernes, también propone que las Fuerzas de Autodefensa puedan rescatar a ciudadanos japoneses atrapados en situaciones de emergencia en el exterior. En esos casos, las tropas japonesas podrían utilizar las armas bajo determinadas circunstancias.

El cambio en la doctrina militar japonesa mantiene profundamente dividida a la sociedad de ese país. El Gobierno japonés sostiene que es necesaria para poder asistir a sus aliados en situaciones comprometidas, mientras que sus detractores temen que los soldados nipones se vean expuestos innecesariamente al peligro o que la imagen del país en el exterior se vea perjudicada.
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Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 18/3/2015, 1:06 pm

Con la aprobacion del Parlamento Japones, veremos ondear la bandera del Sol Naciente en diferentes
flancos del mar del Sur de China, y no se quedaran descubiertos(por aire, submarino ni terrestre).
Las naciones vecinas que estan incomodas con las posiciones estrategicas en los islotes ya
tomadas como territorio Chino, tomaran sus propias posturas en esta movida de balance naval
en dicha zona. ( Veremos como se avisan y saludan mutuamente cuando se encuentren en alta mar
de acuerdo a la nueva propuesta China para los buques de guerra en el mar internacional)!!!! qt
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Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 21/3/2015, 3:45 pm

Mientras que el Parlamento JAPONES este a punto de aprobar las medidas de forma legal de
proceder a realizar la extension de inspeccion aerea y maritima por las Fuerzas militares
Japonesas en el Mar del Sur de China, ahora la flota 7a de la Armada de E.U., favorece
Nonguna de ellas parecieran las realidades que involucra su participacion, sino la
determinacion de no tolerar el crecimiento de las fuerzas (en atolones e islotes de las Sprantley)
por posicionamientos Chinos sin previo aviso.

U.S. 7th Fleet Would Support ASEAN South China Sea Patrols

By: Sam LaGrone
March 20, 2015 12:04 PM

Vice Adm. Robert Thomas, commander of U.S. 7th Fleet, delivers remarks during a change of command ceremony aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN-73). US Navy Photo

The head of U.S. naval forces in the Western Pacific said the U.S. would support an emerging plan to create multi-national patrols in the South China Sea that could bear similarities to anti-piracy patrols in the Strait of Malacca.

During a meeting this week with naval leaders from Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) U.S. 7th Fleet commander Vice Adm. Robert Thomas said the U.S. would back a combined ASEAN maritime patrol in the hotly contested region.

“Perhaps easier said than done, from both a policy and organization perspective, such an initiative could help crystallize the operational objectives in the training events that ASEAN navies want to pursue,” Thomas said at a panel session with navy chiefs quoted by news service Bloomberg.
“If ASEAN members were to take the lead in organizing something along those lines, trust me, the U.S. 7th Fleet would be ready to support.”

Pentagon officials gave the plan a tacit endorsement in a Friday statement to USNI News. “The Department welcomes collaborative efforts to bolster maritime security in the Asia-Pacific, including ASEAN-led efforts. We believe that close cooperation between and among ASEAN member-states is critical to sustaining peace and prosperity in the region,” Pentagon spokeswoman Henrietta Levin said in a statement.
“However, at this time, we are not aware of any specific plans or proposals by ASEAN countries to develop a combined maritime force.”

Any maritime patrol force with U.S. involvement or approval would certainly flare Chinese tempers.

The South China Sea contested territorial claims have been a constant issue between ASEAN countries and China.

subir fotos online

A map of China's shifting definition of the so-called Nine-Dash Line. US State Dept. Image

Both the Philippines and Vietnam have clashed with China politically over claims to the Spratley and Paracel Island chains and has conducted extensive reclamation work for military facilities.

A regional code of conduct between China and ASEAN countries has been in the works since 2013 but has largely been stalled.

As to the patrols, there is some precedent for combined ASEAN operations.

The scheme could be based on the existing model of combined ASEAN forces anti-piracy patrol in the Strait of Malacca near Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, according to press reports in the Philippines quoting Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command (FOIC) Vice Adm. Jesus Millan.

“Vice Adm. Millan [said] that for this ‘resource intensive initiative’ to work, all countries concerned should agree in working together in protecting the ‘Freedom of Navigation’ or the safety and security of seaborne trade and international shipping,” read the online report from radio station DWDD.

The plan follows comments from 7th Fleet’s Thomas in January that suggested Japan should consider surface and air patrols in the South China Sea, which quickly drew the ire of the Chinese.

“Countries outside this region should respect efforts made by countries in the region to maintain peace and stability,” said Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying in late January.

On Thursday a group of Senate leaders expressed their own concerns over the South China Sea on Thursday.

In a letter addressed to Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Secretary of State John Kerry, the chairs and ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees expressed concern over Chinese reclamation efforts in the Spratleys.

“For the international community to continue benefiting from the rules-based international order that has brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific region for the last seven decades, the Unidted States must work together with like-minded parternes and allies to develop and employ a strategy that aims to shape China’s coercive peacetime behavior,” read the letter signed by Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) and Bob Menendez (D-N.J.).
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Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 5/4/2015, 8:06 pm

Entrenamiento, entrenamiento, entrenamiento, por aire, por mar y por tierra, y ahora
no solos, sino en conjunto con: Filipinas, Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Taiwan y desde
luego, con los socios con bases en su propia tierra, los E.U.
Se sabe que los Rusos con los Chinos, han realizado maniobras conjuntas, operaciones
submarinas, ejercicios aereos e intercambio de equipos, naves y armamento,
mas los Japoneses no descansan, en probar sus equipos, habilitar maniobras nuevas,
incorporar tecnologias avanzadas, y demostrar su capacidad de coordinar sus armas
con sus vecinos.

Nada ha detenido su implementacion de elementos de CALIDAD TOTAL(ISHIKAWA), con MEJORA CONTINUA(KAIZEN), con entregas JUSTO A TIEMPO (KANVAN), asi como la evolucion de
dispositivos, tecnologia y adaptaciones a la industria militar propia e indigenizada de los
paises desarrollados con inversiones conjuntas.(Reino Unido, Francia, India, E.U., Suecia,etc).
Mientras que los Chinos se adelantan en la coraza de las unidades flotantes, aereas y
de lanzamientos en la estratosfera, sus mecanismos tecnologicos que les impidan ser
detectados, neutralizados y minimizados, aun no estan en el pleno control Nipon.
Su contra-estrategia Japonesa, estriba en adelantar las preguntas y preparar las
respuestas de la logica China, que no tienen aun el entendimiento de la mentalidad vecina.

Entender la mentalidad progresiva de la logica Japonesa, exige logismos de lenguaje e interpretaciones de sus extrapolaciones cuanticas en las estrategias militares y
disenos de actuacion avanzada.

Japanese navy to extend its reach into Pacific again, and the US is happy about it

1 DAY AGO APRIL 04, 2015 9:47PM
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Power play ... The crew of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force's new helicopter-carrying destroyer "Izumo" attend a ceremony on its flight deck at the Japan Marine United Corp's factory in Yokohama, Kanagawa prefecture on March 25, 2015. Source: AFP Source: AFP
JAPAN is back. After almost 70 years of military obscurity, the island nation is exploiting loopholes in its pacifist constitution to rebuild its military. But what does the US think?
Seventy years ago this week, United States and British forces attacked the Ryukyu Islands. Chief among the territory — which Japan regards as part of its home territory — was Okinawa island.
Within months Imperial Japan was defeated, and a strict new pacifist constitution imposed.
Now, as China races to embrace more of the East and South China Seas, and the United States’ “pivot” to Asia has slowed, it needs strong allies in the Pacific. Japan is that.
FLASHPOINT ASIA: The rising tensions to Australia’s north
Senior US and Japanese military officers say they hope the Japanese navy may soon be freed up to play a more active role in the Pacific and beyond, plying some of the world’s most hotly contested waters.
But, at home, Japan remains divided over proposed changes in the role it should play in regional security issues.
The wounds of World War II run deep. And not just inside Japan. Many Asian nations remain uncomfortable with the idea. Memories of Japan’s aircraft carriers and warships storming across the Pacific in 1942 remain strong.


On the advance ... Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) fleet during a fleet review in Sagami Bay, south of Tokyo. The United States is loosening its 70-year-old leash, encouraging the build up of Japanese naval power. Source: AP /Itsuo Inouye Source: Supplied

sube imagenes

Vice Adm. Robert Thomas, commander of the US Seventh Fleet, said he expects revisions headed for approval in Japan’s parliament will make it easier for the Japanese and allied navies to cooperate more smoothly in the Indian and Pacific oceans.
It’s also one of the reasons Washington is urging an Australia-Japan submarine deal: It sees such a multibillion-dollar project as strengthening regional defence ties.
Japan is shifting its defence priorities from northern reaches near Russia to the East China Sea, where Tokyo and Beijing are locked in a dispute over a chain of uninhabited islands — part of the same Ryukyu Island chain assaulted exactly 70 years ago.
ASIAN ARMS RACE: Expensive and extensive shopping list of weapons
Japan is setting up an amphibious deployment unit similar to the US.
Marines to respond quickly to any invasion of those islands and is also planning to upgrade its air deff T
Long memories ... Japanese World War II veterans hold an Imperial navy flag in front of Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine after offering prayers for the country's war dead on an anniversary of Japan's surrender at the end of World War Two. Source: NewsCorp Source: AFP

One of the key strategic goals for Tokyo and Washington is to allow Japan to participate in what is known as collective self-defence, meaning that it would be able to come to the aid of an ally under attack even if that did not entail a direct attack on Japan or its own military.
“They have the capacity and the capability in international waters and international airspace anywhere on the globe. That’s the important point,” Thomas told reporters earlier this week.
“The decisions that are pending with regard to collective self-defence will clearly allow the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces to interact with, frankly, a lot of international partners, not just the US Seventh Fleet, in a more flexible fashion.”

Name game ... It’s a “helicopter destroyer”, not an aircraft carrier or amphibious assault ship. Japan remains sensitive about its growing military might. Source: USN Source: Supplied

subir imagenes

China’s air force recently held its first exercise in western Pacific Ocean, reportedly conducting drills between Taiwan and the Philippines. Last year, it also deployed its first aircraft carrier on manoeuvres in the East and South China Seas.
According to the Japanese Defense Ministry, Japanese fighters are also on track to set a new high for emergency scrambles against airspace incursions, increasingly by Chinese aircraft.
Russia’s being belligerent again, too.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, wary of the expansion of the Chinese military, has been a major advocate of loosening post-war restr

Rising dragon, falling eagle ... Crewmembers of the “Golden Falcons” helicopter squadron falling eagle ... Crewmembers of the “Golden Falcons” helicopter squadron aboard the USS Blue Ridge take a break beside their aircraft during a port call in Yokohama. Source: AP Source: AP

Tokyo and Washington both want Japan to be able to send its troops farther from its shores with fewer restrictions and join in a wider range of activities, from humanitarian operations to exercises in more locations and with a broader range of partners.
“There are areas that we can’t now do in a seamless way (with the allied ships), so we hope that these areas will be improved in the process of formulating the guidelines,” Vice Adm. Eiichi Funada, commander of the Japanese fleet, said alongside Thomas at the news conference on the deck of the Blue Ridge.
He said that Japan has been very concerned with the expansion of the Chinese military in recent years.
“Their recent exercises were also a matter of attention for us. We are not sure what the exact significance of the exercises was, but as part of the expansion of the Chinese military, it is something that we must watch with caution and continue to collect intelligence on.”
Thomas was more cautious.
“The fact that the PLAN — the Chinese navy — and the Chinese air force continue to expand operations in international waters and international airspace is a natural evolution for them,” he said. “The Chinese navy and more and more the Chinese air force operate globally as do the Japanese as does the United States, as do many international navies with those kinds of capabilities.”

Approche de l'Ouest à l'Est de négociations, reçoit l'oriental l'avance des réponses
Approccio occidentale all'europa orientale negoziati, riceve oriental anticipo le risposte

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Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 5/5/2015, 12:11 am

Lo que no se refleja como un acuerdo estrategico global del Japon, la nueva intencion
de ampliar los lazos comerciales, industriales y extra-militares con palses Europeos
y algunos integrantes de la OTAN, se puede apreciar con la presencia de un enviado
Britanico ( ex-comandante de Destructor HMS York (tipo 42), el cual tambien fue
asignado como attache militar en la 7 flota del Pacifico de la armada de E.U., y
ahora participando en las tareas de entrenamiento, maniobras y desplazamiento de
patrullas y evoluciones tecnologicas que tienen intereses mutuos de comprension,
coordinacion y aplicacion de metodos conjuntos.
China no se queda en mutis cuando ven la cooperacion conjunta de naciones
occidentales con el Japon, y sin olvidar la diplomacia britanica con los Chinos,
la esencia militar del Commonwealth pareciera alistarse para sus proximos
portaviones en construccion.

Why a Royal Navy officer is serving with the Japanese

In an effort to deepen cooperation on maritime security and anti-terrorism effort, a Royal Navy officer is serving as a Liaison Officer to the Japanese Fleet


Cmdr Simon Staley

By Julian Ryall, Yokohama, Japan 9:27PM BST 24 Apr 2015

For the first time since the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1923, a Royal Navy officer is serving as a Liaison Officer to the Japanese Fleet and is tasked with building strategic and operational links between the two services.
Cdr Simon Staley is primarily employed as an Exchange Officer with the US Navy's Seventh Fleet for his nine-month posting, but says his exposure as the Royal Navy's representative to the wider regional powers sends a "critical" strategic message.

"Due to current standing UK and Nato maritime commitments in other parts of the world – such as the North and South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf – the Royal Navy rarely deploys assets to the Asia-Pacific these days," 47-year-old Cdr Staley told The Telegraph. "It is the tyranny of distance.
"However, it does have the capability to do so and therefore it is vital that we build and maintain a strong understanding of both this complicated region and our allies within it.

"This is an excellent opportunity for the UK to work closely with not only our long-term US Navy partner, but also now with our highly professional Japanese counterparts for the first time for more than 90 years," he said.
"Of course, we have a lot to share with and learn from the Japanese and US fleets, and this new position allows me to observe and provide UK perspective and nuanced insights that may influence how we best integrate for global operations".

A Japan Coast Guard vessel sprays water at Taiwanese fishing boats, near the disputed Senkaku islands in the East China Sea


Cdr Staley, who previously commanded the Type-42 destroyer HMS York, arrived in Japan in September 2014 to liaise with the Maritime Self-Defence Forces and is attached to the headquarters of the Seventh Fleet at Yokosuka Naval Base, two hours south of Tokyo.

His posting came about after an agreement of identified necessity between Admiral Sir George Zambellas, the Royal Navy's First Sea Lord, and Vice Admiral Robert Thomas junior, the commander of the US Seventh Fleet, and is designed to improve ties in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
Cdr Staley's posting also comes in the wake of London and Tokyo signing a series of agreements to cooperate on maritime security and anti-terrorism efforts, as well as in the realms of space and cyberspace.

Cdr Staley previously commanded the Type-42 Destroyer HMS York

And while the US will remain Japan's most important military ally, Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister, has made it clear that his government is looking to forge new security alliances with nations that have similar defence concerns and an equal commitment to international security.

Can Shinzo Abe put Japan 'back at the centre of the world’?

Tokyo has also vowed to do more in the areas of antipiracy operations and humanitarian relief.
"We have many similarities," said Cdr Staley. "We are island nations with a commitment to democracy, similar economies and military capabilities, and a shared reliance on the sea for the security and prosperity of our peoples.

"Some 90 per cent of the world's seaborne trade transits nine key global choke points, and with $5 trillion [£3.29 trillion] worth passing through the Asia-Pacific's sea highways annually, this part of the globe now has a major economic significance for the UK," he said.

"And this strategic alliance with Japan now gives us a sure toe-in."
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Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 12/5/2015, 7:54 pm

Para los medios Chinos y Estrategas del mismo pais; les ha de sonar como amenaza o atentado,
los pasos agigantados para imponer sus posiciones en las Islas Spratley y los
Atolones Scarborouugh, no estan solos, tendran la presencia militar naval
de la Flota Filipina y Japonesa en ejercicios conjuntos para ampliar su entendimiento
y el entrenamiento preciso para maniobras de interes mutuo.
La diplomacia de sus declaraciones, con cuidado preciso, indican a los respectivos
medios Chinos, que no se tiene como objetivo presentar un frente comun en su contra,
ni preparar las lanzas y sus armas para tener encuentros belicos en su contra.

Philippines, Japan Hold Naval Drills in South China Sea

Anti-Terrorist Units of the Philippine and Japanese Coast Guards (R) prepare to target a vessel and engage the mock pirates during a combined maritime law enforcement exercise at a bay in Manila, May 6, 2015.

William Gallo
May 12, 2015 3:35 AM

The Philippines and Japan, which each have bitter maritime disputes with China, have conducted their first ever bilateral naval exercises.

The day-long drills Tuesday in the South China Sea involved two Japanese destroyers and a Philippine Navy frigate, according to Manila.

Philippines officials insisted the drills were not meant to send a message to China, but were instead focused on improving military capabilities

"This is for safety purposes, just to avoid encounters at sea, unusual incidents," Philippine Navy chief Jesus Millan told GMA News Online.

But China's Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chungying on Tuesday made it clear that Beijing remained concerned with the drills.

"We have noticed the relevant report and will pay close attention to it. As you can see, at present the overall situation of South China Sea is stable. We hope the relevant country can respect the efforts and willingness of the regional countries who are protecting the peace and stability in the region by themselves, do not hype up the tension everywhere and do not take actions that could harm the security and mutual trust among the regional countries and actions that could affect regional peace and stability," she said.

Hua also accused Manila of "repeatedly" violating international laws and "stirring up" tensions. "The evidence has proved again that the Philippines is truly a rule breaker and the trouble maker," she said.

Scarborough Shoal

Philippines officials told local media that Tuesday's drills would be held within the Philippine's 44-kilometer contiguous zone, near Corregidor Island, where there is no territorial dispute with China.

About 300 kilometers to the west lies the reefs, rocks, and rich fishing grounds of Scarborough Shoal, which is claimed by Manila and Beijing. Following a 2012 standoff, China seized the strategic shoal and has prevented Philippine fishing boats from reaching the area.

Spratly Islands

Further south, China is strengthening its presence with an ambitious series of land-reclamation efforts in the Spratly Islands, parts of which are claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.

The moves are reflective of the way in which China has gradually asserted its authority over the South China Sea. Beijing claims nearly the entire 3.5-million square kilometer area, which is rich in natural resources and is a main trade route.

On Monday, Philippine military chief Gregorio Catapang visited the disputed Thitu Island. He vowed to defend the island, which Manila refers to as Pagasa.

"I'm visiting this place to establish the fact that Pagasa is a municipality of Palawan, and Palawan is a province of the Philippines. And therefore, Pagasa is a territory of the Republic of the Philippines," said General Catapang.

The island is administered by the Philippines, but is also claimed by China, which refers to the island as Zhongye.

Separately, Japan is involved in a dispute with China over territory in the East China Sea. The main flashpoint between the two countries in recent years has been a set of uninhabited islands known in Japan as Senkaku and in China as Diaoyu.

Some of the rival claimants have strengthened bilateral ties, as part of what is seen as an effort to portray a unified front against the military and economic might of a rising China. Many have also developed closer military ties with the U.S.

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Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 18/1/2016, 11:20 pm

De nuevo, el Consultor Toshi Yoshihara, quien ha participado como Vocero y panelista
de la estrategia maritima actual en El Colegio de Guerra Naval de los EU., resalta y
vuelve a aclarar las medidas de acotamiento que las fuerzas navales Japonesas,
tienen, trabajan para mejorar y han trazado sus medidas y directivas para que tengan
decidan traspasar la primera linea de Islas y llegar al 2 nivel de zona maritima
estrategica para la Flota China.
La dedicada tarea de entrenar, detectar y reforzar las operaciones apoyadas por
via aerea, maritima y submarina, no tendran miramiento para hacer valer la
similar estrategia de ANTI ACCESO/AREA NEGADA (A2/AD) que la flota China
determino a principios del 1 de Enero del pasado año.

Ahora han definido sus posturas; cuando se decidan querer pasar sus propias
lineas, se vera quien preparo mejor sus posiciones y equipos entrenados para
paralizar los avances contrarios.!!!!

Japan’s master plan to destroy the Chinese Navy in battle
(From the National Interest)

By Harry J. Kazianis

It seems that Japan is developing plans to craft its own Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy—or what one former Japanese official describes as “maritime supremacy and air superiority”—against the Chinese Navy.

The plan itself, detailed by Reuters, makes a tremendous amount of good sense:

“Tokyo is responding by stringing a line of anti-ship, anti-aircraft missile batteries along 200 islands in the East China Sea stretching 1,400 km (870 miles) from the country’s mainland toward Taiwan. . .

“While the installations are not secret, it is the first time such officials have spelled out that the deployment will help keep China at bay in the Western Pacific and amounts to a Japanese version of the “anti-access/area denial” doctrine, known as “A2/AD” in military jargon, that China is using to try to push the United States and its allies out of the region.

“Chinese ships sailing from their eastern seaboard must pass through this seamless barrier of Japanese missile batteries to reach the Western Pacific, access to which is vital to Beijing both as a supply line to the rest of the world’s oceans and for the projection of its naval power.”

The piece also spells out an overall larger Japanese military presence in the East China Sea, which will certainly not please China:

“Over the next five years, Japan will increase its Self-Defense Forces on islands in the East China Sea by about a fifth to almost 10,000 personnel.

“Those troops, manning missile batteries and radar stations, will be backed up by marine units on the mainland, stealthy submarines, F-35 warplanes, amphibious fighting vehicles, aircraft carriers as big as World War Two flat-tops and ultimately the U.S. Seventh Fleet headquartered at Yokosuka, south of Tokyo.”

Does this plan sound familiar? It should if you have been following the topic. Such ideas have been floated in the U.S. national security community for a few years now. Toshi Yoshihara, a past National Interest contributor and professor at the U.S. Naval War College, who is also quoted in the Reuters piece, presented a similar idea as part of a much larger Japanese A2/AD strategy in a Center for New American Security (CNAS) report back in 2014:

“the Ryukyu Islands themselves could support Japanese anti-access forces. For example, truck-mounted anti-ship and anti-air missile units dispersed across the archipelago would erect a formidable barrier. In wartime, effective blocking operations would tempt PLA commanders to nullify these gatekeepers. Such exertions, however, would tie down significant portions of China’s warfighting capacity while depleting manpower and materiel. Because the islands hold little innate value to Beijing the Chinese leadership might decide that escalation was not worth the effort.”

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Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Takeda el 19/1/2016, 9:18 am

Ya había comenzado Japón la construcción de bases aéreas en sus islas más septentrionales, y no hay que olvidar que el potencial industrial japonés es uno de los mayores del Mundo, así que sin duda cuenta con la capacidad para incrementar su flota aérea. Se pone muy interesante el panorama en el Lejano Oriente.
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Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 19/1/2016, 12:31 pm

Takeda escribió:Ya había comenzado Japón la construcción de bases aéreas en sus islas más septentrionales, y no hay que olvidar que el potencial industrial japonés es uno de los mayores del Mundo, así que sin duda cuenta con la capacidad para incrementar su flota aérea. Se pone muy interesante el panorama en el Lejano Oriente.

Dentro de los estudios que se han venido haciendo, la velocidad de construccion de la Armada China es muy rapida, los ultimos movimientos de altos mandos en la estructura, alinea los vectores hacia donde apuntan sus proyectos militares, mas todavia, no llegamos al 2020, fecha que perfila China como
capacitada para alcanzar la primera linea de islas como zona patrimonial inicial, y que los vecinos
han entendido lo que les espera.
Otros elementos a cubrir (ahora inmersos tambien con Japon, Australia,India,y los paises de
Sudasia ademas de los E.U.) son los puntos flojos o debiles que presenta la amplia zona de
cobertura que China sola aspira a manejar. Ahi se veran pasos y cruces que no se han enunciado,
y que seran los factores de ventaja cuando un enfrentamiento ocurra. pirat
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Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 31/1/2016, 8:03 pm

Despues de muchos tirones y comentarios, finalmente tenemos la claridad de que se esta
formando en la alianza NIPONA-GABACHA, (mas los incluidos en el plan- Filipinas, Vietnam, Indonesia e India- sin olvidar a Malasia, Tailandia, Brunei y Australia), para anticipar el anillo de islotes/islas
con equipamiento de radares, estaciones misileras(aereas/navales),estaciones de naves anfibias,
coordinacion de equipos Submarinos sigilozos, asi como las unidades ligeras, intermedias y pesadas
de navegacion logistica con sus respectivos equipos abordo Misileras y equipos AEGIS simultaneos,
que haran mas daño del imaginado en la travesia, proteccion y promocion del crecimiento naval
Chino en el Mar sur de China y el primer circulo de islas.

En el segundo nivel de Marina de agua Azul, tendremos que incorporar, la tecnologia aerea/satelital, para neutralizar los equipos de superficie que esten a la vista.
No hay tecnologia que haya sido convertida en obsoleta, solo que han tenido que actualizar e
invertir en las evoluciones que nunca se detienen!!!!!

Japan's far-flung island defence plan seeks to turn tables on China

Last Updated: Friday, December 18, 2015 - 10:43

Tokyo: Japan is fortifying its far-flung island chain in the East China Sea under an evolving strategy that aims to turn the tables on China`s navy and keep it from ever dominating the Western Pacific Ocean, Japanese military and government sources said.

The United States, believing its Asian allies - and Japan in particular - must help contain growing Chinese military power, has pushed Japan to abandon its decades-old bare-bones home island defence in favour of exerting its military power in Asia.

Tokyo is responding by stringing a line of anti-ship, anti-aircraft missile batteries along 200 islands in the East China Sea stretching 1,400 km (870 miles) from the country`s mainland towards Taiwan.

Interviews with a dozen military planners and government policymakers reveal that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe`s broader goal to beef up the military has evolved to include a strategy to dominate the sea and air surrounding the remote islands.

While the installations are not secret, it is the first time such officials have spelled out that the deployment will help keep China at bay in the Western Pacific and amounts to a Japanese version of the "anti-access/area denial" doctrine, known as "A2/AD" in military jargon, that China is using to try to push the United States and its allies out of the region.

Chinese ships sailing from their eastern seaboard must pass through this seamless barrier of Japanese missile batteries to reach the Western Pacific, access to which is vital to Beijing both as a supply line to the rest of the world`s oceans and for the projection of its naval power.

China`s President Xi Jinping has set great store in developing an ocean-going "blue water" navy capable of defending the country`s growing global interests.

To be sure, there is nothing to stop Chinese warships from sailing through under international law, but they will have to do so in within the crosshairs of Japanese missiles, the officials told Reuters.


As Beijing asserts more control across the nearby South China Sea with almost completed island bases, the string of islands stretching through Japan`s East China Sea territory and south through the Philippines may come to define a boundary between U.S. and Chinese spheres of influence. Military planners dub this the line the "first island chain".

"In the next five or six years the first island chain will be crucial in the military balance between China and the U.S.- Japan," said Satoshi Morimoto, a Takushoku University professor who was defence minister in 2012 and advises the current defence chief, Gen Nakatani.

A U.S. warship in late October challenged territorial limits that China is asserting around its new man-made island bases in the Spratly archipelago.

But Beijing may already have established "facts on the ground" in securing military control of the South China Sea, some officials and experts say.

"We may delay the inevitable, but that train left the station some time ago," a senior U.S. military source familiar with Asia told Reuters, on condition he was not identified because he was not authorised to talk to the media.

China`s "ultimate objective is hegemony over the South China Sea, hegemony over the East China Sea", said Kevin Maher, who headed the U.S. State Department`s Office of Japan Affairs for two years until 2011. "To try and appease the Chinese would just encourage the Chinese to be more provocative," said Maher, now a consultant at NMV Consulting in Washington.


Japan`s counter to China in the East China Sea began in 2010, two years before Abe took power.

The predecessor Democratic Party of Japan government pivoted away from protecting the northern island of Hokkaido against a Soviet invasion that never came to defending the southwest island chain.

"The growing influence of China and the relative decline of the U.S. was a factor," said Akihisa Nagashima, a DPJ lawmaker who as vice minister of defence helped craft that change. "We wanted to do what we could and help ensure the sustainability of the U.S. forward deployment."

China is investing in precision missiles as it seeks to deter the technologically superior U.S. Navy from plying waters or flying near Taiwan or in the South China Sea.

Beijing in September gave friends and potential foes a peek at that growing firepower in its biggest ever military parade, which commemorated Japan`s World War Two defeat. Making its debut was the Dongfeng-21D, a still untested anti-ship ballistic missile that could potentially destroy a $5 billion U.S. aircraft carrier.

It joins an arsenal the U.S. Congress estimates at 1,200 short-range missiles and intermediate missiles that can strike anywhere along the first island chain. China is also developing submarine- and land-launched radar-evading cruise missiles.

"Rather than A2/AD, we use the phrase `maritime supremacy and air superiority`," said Yosuke Isozaki, Abe`s first security adviser until September and a key author of a national defence strategy published in 2013 that included this phrase for the first time.

"Our thinking was that we wanted to be able to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority that fit with the U.S. military," he added.

Toshi Yoshihara, a U.S. Naval War College professor, said Tokyo could play an important role in limiting China`s room for manoeuvre through the East China Sea to the Western Pacific, enhancing U.S. freedom of movement and buying time for the alliance to respond in the event of war with China.

"You could say Japan is turning the tables on China," Yoshihara said.

Memories of Japanese aggression in World War Two still haunt Tokyo`s relations with its near neighbours, and tensions have sharpened since the return to power of Abe, who critics view as a revisionist who wants to downplay Japan`s wartime past.

"Any Japanese military trend will elicit close attention and misgivings from Asian neighbouring countries," China`s National Defense Ministry told Reuters by email in reply to questions about Japan`s island strategy.

"We urge the Japanese side to take history as a mirror, and take more actions in the interests of growing mutual trust."

Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin, commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, cast Japan`s build-up in the East China Sea as complementary to a broader U.S. strategy.

"The U.S. planning process for any theatre takes into consideration the capabilities and forces of friends and potential adversaries," Aucoin told Reuters. "The U.S plans with the ultimate objective of maintaining peace and stability not only for Japan, but also for the region."


Over the next five years, Japan will increase its Self-Defense Forces on islands in the East China Sea by about a fifth to almost 10,000 personnel.

Those troops, manning missile batteries and radar stations, will be backed up by marine units on the mainland, stealthy submarines, F-35 warplanes, amphibious fighting vehicles, aircraft carriers as big as World War Two flat-tops and ultimately the U.S. Seventh Fleet headquartered at Yokosuka, south of Tokyo.

Already cooperating closely, the Japanese and U.S. navies will draw closer than ever after Abe`s new security legislation legitimised collective self-defence, allowing Japan to come to the aid of allies under attack.

One crucial change, said Maher: the U.S. and Japanese military can now plan and practice for war together and deliver a "force multiplier".

Bigger defence outlays are adding potency. Japan`s military is seeking spending in the next fiscal year`s budget that would top 5 trillion yen ($40 billion) for the first time, including money for longer-range anti-ship missiles, sub-hunting aircraft, early-warning planes, Global Hawk drones, Osprey tiltrotor aircraft and a new heavy-lift, long-range transport jet.

In some areas, however, Japan`s military is making do. Anti-ship missiles designed 30 years ago to destroy Soviet landing craft heading for Hokkaido are being deployed to draw the defensive curtain along the southwest island chain.

Able to lob a 225-kg (500-lb) warhead 180 km, they have enough range to cover the gaps between the islands along the chain, said Noboru Yamaguchi, a Sasakawa Peace Foundation adviser and former general who procured them three decades ago.

Japan`s military planners must also figure out how to transform an army used to sticking close to its bases into a more mobile, expeditionary force.

Decades of under-investment in logistics means Japan has too few naval transport ships and military aircraft to carry large numbers of troops and equipment.

A more delicate task for Japan`s government, however, may be persuading people living along the islands to accept a bigger military footprint. After decades hosting the biggest concentration of U.S. troops in Asia, people on Okinawa are voicing greater opposition to the bases.

For now, communities on the long chain of islands, home to 1.5 million people, that have been asked to host Japanese troops are happy to do so, said Ryota Takeda, a lawmaker who as vice defence minister until Sept. 2014 travelled there frequently to win residents` approval for new deployments.

"Unlike officials sitting in the Ministry of Defense in Tokyo they are more attuned to the threat they face every day."
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Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 5/3/2016, 10:58 pm

Repitiendo la historia de ponerle al JAPON las limitaciones de obtener acceso libre
y adquirir sus provisiones, materiales y equipos para continuar su crecimiento y
desarrollo tecnologico de avanzada, LOS MOVIMIENTOS EQUIVALENTES A LA REPETICION
de antes de la 2 guerra, donde el JAPON se vio en la necesidad de atacar a sus
vecinos para poder tener posiciones estrategicas de control de transito de bienes
y tener dominio en la zona, AHORA CHINA ESTA PROVOCANDO SU REACCION.
Para beneficio de JAPON, esta medida unilateral de reclamar como territorio chino
los islotes, atolones y posiciones dentro de las ISLAS SPRATLEY y las que se encuentran
cercanas a Filipinas, los Nipones han realizado acuerdos y contribuciones para que la
alianza en la zona se mantenga consensada, respaldada y motivada a no cerrar
su libre transito. Ahora veremos que le toca a CHINA CUMPLIR para que los vecinos
no los tengan censurados o medidos en sus transitos.

How China is driving Japan closer to Southeast Asia

As Sino-Japanese relations sour, Tokyo has been boosting political, economic and defense ties with Southeast Asia in a bid to strengthen its position in the region. DW examines how this is impacting the balance of power.
China und Japan Flaggen Archiv 2012
Japan, Asia's second-largest economy, has had important relations with Southeast Asian nations throughout the post-1945 era. For instance, the country has long been a major provider of overseas development aid, and Japanese companies have invested heavily in the region, taking advantage of its lower labor costs by locating significant portions of their manufacturing activities there.
Additionally, Southeast Asia has long served as an important supplier of raw materials to Japan, especially gas from Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia, as well as coal from Indonesia. In turn, Japanese firms have sought to increase their exports of manufactured goods and services to the region, with bilateral trade between Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) amounting to $248 billion in 2011.
But while this close relationship has existed for decades, ties have intensified recently, particularly since the return to power of conservative PM Shinzo Abe in December 2012. "Prime Minister Abe signaled the increasing importance of this region to Japan by making Southeast Asia the destination for his first overseas trip during his second term," James D. J. Brown, an expert on international affairs at Temple University's campus in Tokyo, told DW.

A turning point

A key factor in this context, say experts, were the anti-Japanese riots in China in late 2012, which were triggered by territorial disputes over the islets of the Senkaku/Diaoyu island chain in the East China Sea (ECS), which both countries claim.
Malaysia East Asia Summit - Shinzo Abe
Relations between Japan and ASEAN have intensified since the return to power of PM Abe
After this episode, Japanese multinational corporations recognized the risks to their global supply chain from having too much dependence on China-based production, and started shifting their investments away from China and increasingly setting their sights on the ASEAN region.
"The anti-Japanese riots in China increased the attractiveness of Southeast Asia as an alternative location for manufacturing production," Rajiv Biswas, Asia-Pacific Chief Economist at global analytics firm IHS, told DW. As a bloc, ASEAN is the third-largest economy in Asia and has a total population of 620 million.
Other factors pushing Japanese multinationals towards lower wage economies such as Vietnam and Indonesia are China's rising manufacturing costs and the overall economic slowdown. This is because, if Chinese growth were to grind to a halt, the negative effect that this would undoubtedly have on the Japanese economy could be partially offset by strong economic relations with ASEAN, as analyst Brown pointed out.
Conflicting interests
But the reasons behind Japan's rebalance are not limited to economics. Tokyo has also been alarmed at China's growing assertiveness in territorial disputes not only in the ECS but also in the South China Sea (SCS).
"Japan sees China in the ECS and SCS as attempting to become the regional hegemon," Stephen R. Nagy, an associate professor on International Studies at the International Christian University in Tokyo, told DW.

How radar could help China boost control over South China Sea

Satellite images show China may be installing a high-frequency radar system in the Spratlys - a move that would vastly extend Beijing's ability to monitor traffic in the South China Sea, analyst
Are South China Sea tensions triggering an arms race?

The expert argues that the ECS dispute is not really about the islets but rather about access to the Asia Pacific and pushing out US influence, while the SCS row is mainly about trade and energy security for both China and Japan. "China sees the SCS as its backyard that requires securitization while Japan sees the region as a crucial sea lane," Nagy underlined.

While Japan is no SCS littoral state and is not party to the territorial disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, Tokyo views the issue as extremely important to its national security given that a large proportion of the country's trade passes through these disputed waters, including all of the vital energy resources that Japan imports from the Middle East.
In light of this, Kristen Gunness, an expert on the Chinese military and the CEO of Vantage Point Asia LLC, argues that Beijing's assertiveness in the region "has definitely played a role in pushing Japan to form closer ties to Southeast Asian nations."
Enhancing military ties
As China continues its land reclamation activities in the SCS, the other nations in East and Southeast Asia have a vested interest in pushing back, said the analyst, adding that one of the best ways to achieve this is through an increased maritime presence.
This explains why Japan has been actively seeking to strengthen relations with ASEAN, and in particular with those states in the bloc that are most willing to stand up to China's behavior. "It is for this reason that Japan's security cooperation is directed primarily towards the Philippines and Vietnam, since both of these states have serious territorial disputes with China over the SCS," said analyst Brown.
This has resulted in Japan taking the controversial step of reinterpreting the country's pacifist constitution to permit the use of military force in a wider range of circumstances as well as significantly easing its long-standing restrictions of arms sales. Moreover, Tokyo has been ramping up of efforts to intensify defense and security exchanges and providing assistance for ASEAN governments to build up their maritime security capacity.
For instance, Japan and the Philippines upgraded ties to a "strengthened strategic partnership" when Filipino President Benigno Aquino visited Prime Minister Abe in Tokyo in June 2015. The Abe administration also agreed to provide the Philippines with 10 multirole vessels for use in upholding the archipelago's maritime security. Lastly, in May 2015, Japan and the Philippines conducted their first joint naval exercises in the SCS.
Japan Philippinen gemeinsame Manöver im Südchinesischen Meer
Japan and the Philippines conducted their first joint naval exercises in the SCS in May 2015
Similarly, Japan and Vietnam became strategic partners in 2006 and a deal was reached in 2014 for Japan to supply six maritime vessels. In 2015, an agreement was also made permitting ships from Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) to make port calls in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay.
Lastly and most controversially, in November 2015, PM Abe announced that he was considering the possibility of Japan's MSDF conducting patrols in the SCS. "This statement was quickly condemned by China's Foreign Ministry as an unwelcome 'intervention' in an area that Beijing considers to be of vital national importance," said Brown.

Mutually beneficial ties
But how does ASEAN benefit from the Sino-Japanese rivalry? Experts such as Biswas point out that closer economic and security relations with Japan are clearly in the interest of Southeast Asian states.
"Many Southeast Asian countries have strong trade and investment ties with China but are becoming increasingly concerned about its military assertiveness. Therefore strengthening ties with Japan is seen as one approach by some of these nations to reduce their vulnerability to China," said the economist.
Moreover, competition between Japanese and Chinese companies to win contracts in the region will enable the Southeast Asian governments to extract more favorable terms from the bidders, say experts.
And as for defense ties, although Japan's potential for military activity remains constitutionally constrained, the growing security cooperation between Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam is expected to help to partially alleviate these states' concerns about maritime security.
The road ahead
As a result, says analyst Gunness, Japan will likely continue to use a combination of military and economic incentives to increase its influence with ASEAN in the near future. "Economically, Japan will boost investments and foreign development assistance to increase its presence and influence," she said.
Toyota Auto Autohersteller Produktion Gewinnprognose angehoben
Japanese companies have been shifting their investments away from China and increasingly setting their sights on the ASEAN region
And as the region develops economically, there will be growing opportunities for Japanese companies to increase exports of high-tech goods and take part in large-scale infrastructure projects. Furthermore, said analyst Brown, as labor shortages begin to intensify in Japan, many more Japanese firms are likely to consider relocating their manufacturing activities to Southeast Asia.
In the military realm, Gunness expects to see more high-level visits by both civilian and military leaders, as well as joint military and training exercises between Japan and ASEAN nations and between their respective coast guards. Assistance with maritime surveillance and reconnaissance might also be something Japan would consider helping Southeast Asian militaries and coast guards with, she added.
The combination of all these factors, explains Koh Swee Lean Collin, an associate research fellow at the Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, have led to Japan's increased role in Southeast Asia being welcomed even by neutral countries such as Indonesia.
"These geopolitical, economic and technical factors all combine to justify Japan's strategic 'pivot' to Southeast Asia. And it is China's assertiveness which has undoubtedly provided the most convincing and overarching driving force of all," Koh told DW.

Contenido patrocinado

Re: Japon establece como estrategia similar a China, limitar acceso a zonas aereas/maritimas territoriales

Mensaje por Contenido patrocinado

    Fecha y hora actual: 20/7/2018, 1:59 am