Este es un foro dedicado a las Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas así como de los diferentes Cuerpos de Policía y demás entes que se dedican a la Seguridad interna de México.


Guerra de espionaje y contra-espinaje Británico - 2 Guerra

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Guerra de espionaje y contra-espinaje Británico - 2 Guerra

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 21/11/2013, 12:36 pm

Durante la 2 Guerra Mundial,  los Alemanes rompieron esquemas de seguridad de avanzada para la época, exigiendo que los Aliados, se organizaran para contrarrestar el efecto de estos dispositivos
que permitían la transmisión de instrucciones, directrices, ordenes de avanzar o atacar, sin que los Británicos ni Franceses entendieran su significado.
 Bletchley Park, fue el centro de descifrado en Inglaterra, una vez que la inteligencia Polaca, al igual que comandos que rescataron de un U-BOAT la primera maquina Enigma, y que sub-secuentemente fueron capaces de decodificar sus mensajes con lujo de detalles.
 La evolución de este modelo durante la Guerra, complico por unos meses la tarea de descifrado, mas se logró superar con precisión los cambios.
 Aquí incluyo algunas notas e imágenes que muestran una semblanza de la aplicación de las matemáticas a la guerra preliminar cibernética.






Maquina Enigma etiquetada en un Museo:



Piezas de los rotores, anillos y sus elementos de ensamble



Rotores de la maquina Enigma  con los anillos conteniendo el abecedario 




Maquina Enigma version Naval, utilizada en los U-BOATS para atacar coordinadamente en manada de lobos como popularmente se le llamaba al formato de ataque a los buques mercantes y militares aliados:



Circuito electrico de la maquina Enigma alemana:



Grafica de la patente de la maquina encriptadora ENIGMA  con fecha de 1928:



Imagen donde aparece el General Alemán Guderain en la campaña de invasión a Francia en 1940:

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Re: Guerra de espionaje y contra-espinaje Británico - 2 Guerra

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 21/11/2013, 12:50 pm


 Elementos de la maquina Lorenz SZ42  con 12 anillos de letras, multiplicando exponencialmentee las combinaciones de mensajes encriptados.



Colección de maquinas Enigma expuestas en museo:



La maquina Britanica TOMMY, equivalente a la maquina Enigma alemana:
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Re: Guerra de espionaje y contra-espinaje Británico - 2 Guerra

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 21/11/2013, 12:53 pm

Captain Ridley's Shooting Party
 
 l
La llegada del equipo de caza del Capitan Ridley a la mansion ubicada en la campiña de Buckinghamshire en los últimos días de Agosto de 1938, fue para establecer el escenario de uno de las mas interesantes historias de la 2 guerra mundial. Tenian un aire de amigos relajados en un fin de semana para una reunión en la campiña.  De hecho llevaron al mejor chef del Hotel Savoy para que preparara su comida. Mas el pequeño grupo de amigos se convirtió en lo que mas tarde seria Bletchey Park, no fue nada relajante. Todos ellos eran miembros del M16, y de la escuela de descifrado y códigos del gobierno, equipo secreto de miembros y académicos convertidos en rompecodigos. Su misión, observar si Bletchey Park podría operar como una ubicación en tiempo de guerra, bien alejado de Londres, para la actividad de inteligencia del M16  y de la GC&CS.
The arrival of ‘Captain Ridley's Shooting Party’ at a mansion house in the Buckinghamshire countryside in late August 1938 was to set the scene for one of the most remarkable stories of World War Two. They had an air of friends enjoying a relaxed weekend together at a country house. They even brought with them one of the best chefs at the Savoy Hotel to cook their food. But the small group of people who turned up at Bletchley Park were far from relaxed. They were members of MI6, and the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), a secret team of individuals including a number of scholars turned Codebreakers. Their job; to see whether Bletchley Park would work as a wartime location, well away from London, for intelligence activity by GC&CS as well as elements of MI6.
The GC&CS mission was to crack the Nazi codes and ciphers. The most famous of the cipher systems to be broken at Bletchley Park was the Enigma. There were also a large number of lower-level German systems to break as well as those of Hitler's allies. At the start of the war in September 1939 the codebreakers returned to Bletchey Park to begin their war-winning work in earnest.
The Story Continues: Breaking Enigma
Breaking Enigma
The Poles had broken Enigma in 1932, when the encoding machine was undergoing trials with the German Army. But when the Poles broke Enigma, the cipher altered only once every few months. With the advent of war, it changed at least once a day, giving 159 million million million possible settings to choose from. The Poles decided to inform the British in July 1939 once they needed help to break Enigma and with invasion of Poland imminent..
As more and more people arrived to join the codebreaking operations, the various sections began to move into large pre-fabricated wooden huts set up on the lawns of the Park. For security reasons, the various sections were known only by their hut numbers.
The first operational break into Enigma came around the 23 January 1940, when the team working under Dilly Knox, with the mathematicians John Jeffreys, Peter Twinn and Alan Turing, unravelled the German Army administrative key that became known at Bletchley Park as ‘The Green’. Encouraged by this success, the Codebreakers managed to crack the ‘Red’ key used by the Luftwaffe liaison officers co-ordinating air support for army units. Gordon Welchman, soon to become head of the Army and Air Force section, devised a system whereby his Codebreakers were supported by other staff based in a neighbouring hut, who turned the deciphered messages into intelligence reports.
The Story Continues: From Intercept to Action
Intercept to Action
Secrecy shrouded the fact that Enigma had been broken. To hide this information, the reports were given the appearance of coming from an MI6 spy, codenamed Boniface, with a network of imaginary agents inside Germany.
While this was pure fiction, there was a real network monitoring the Germans’ every move. The ‘Y’ Service, a chain of wireless intercept stations across Britain and in a number of countries overseas, listened in to the enemy's radio messages. Thousands of wireless operators, many of them civilians but also Wrens, WAAF personnel and members of the ATS, tracked the enemy radio nets up and down the dial, carefully logging every letter or figure. The messages were then sent back to Bletchley Park (Station X) to be deciphered, translated and fitted together like a gigantic jigsaw puzzle to produce as complete a picture as possible of what the enemy was doing.
The Codebreakers began working around the clock to send the intelligence they were producing to London. Special Liaison Units and their associated communications specialists, the Special Communication Units, were set up to feed the Bletchley Park intelligence to commanders in the field, first briefly in France in May 1940 and then in North Africa and elsewhere from March 1941 onwards.
The Story Continues: The Industrialisation of Codebreaking
Industrialisation of Codebreaking
The process of breaking Enigma was aided considerably by a complex electro-mechanical device, designed by Alan Turing and Gordon Welchman. The Bombe, as it was called, ran through all the possible Enigma wheel configurations in order to reduce the possible number of settings in use to a manageable number for further hand testing. The Bombes were operated by Wrens, many of whom lived in requisitioned country houses such as Woburn Abbey. The work they did in speeding up the codebreaking process was indispensable.
In October 1941 after receiving a letter from some of the senior codebreakers decrying the lack of resources being afforded them, Prime Minister Winston Churchill directed:
‘Make sure they have all they want extreme priority and report to me that this has been done.’
From that moment on Bletchley Park began receiving a huge influx of resources and a major building programme ensued to create the space necessary to house the ever increasing workforce.
The Story Continues: Codebreaking Successes
Codebreaking Successes 
The intelligence produced by deciphering the Naval Enigma was passed to the Admiralty via the Z Watch in the Naval Section. However, in the early days, they struggled to get the naval commanders to take it seriously but a series of spectacular successes turned things around for the Codebreakers. Throughout the First Battle of the Atlantic, they helped the Admiralty to track the U-Boat wolf packs, considerably reducing the German Navy's ability to sink the merchant navy ships bringing vital supplies to Britain from America.
Nor were the Germans the only targets for Station X - by breaking Japanese ciphers, the Codebreakers were able to monitor the Japanese preparations for war. The suggestion that they knew of the imminent attack on Pearl Harbor but kept quiet in order to ensure America joined the war is nonsense. But their expertise undoubtedly gave great assistance to the American codebreakers.
In 1942, the Codebreakers' many successes also included the North Africa Campaign, when they enabled the Royal Navy to cut Rommel's supply lines and kept Montgomery informed of the Desert Fox's every move. Early 1942 brought serious difficulties with the German Navy’s introduction of a more complex Enigma cipher. But by the end of 1942 they had mastered it as well.
The Story Continues: Strategic Ciphers
Strategic Ciphers
Perhaps Bletchley Park's greatest success was still to come with the breaking of the Germans' strategic ciphers. These complex ciphers were used to secure communications between Hitler in Berlin and his army commanders in the field. The intelligence value of breaking into these was immense. Initial efforts were manual and successful, but could not keep up with the volume of intercepts. Under Professor Max Newman the ‘Newmanry’ started to devise machines to mechanise the process. This ultimately led to the design and construction by the brilliant General Post Office (GPO) engineer Tommy Flowers of ‘Colossus’, the world's first semi-programmable electronic computer. Breaking into these ciphers allowed the Allied staff planning for the invasion of Europe to obtain unprecedented detail of the German defences.
The Codebreakers made a vital contribution to D-Day in other ways. The breaking of the ciphers of the German Secret Intelligence Service allowed the British to confuse Hitler over where the Allies were to land. His decision to divert troops away from the Normandy beaches undoubtedly ensured the invasion's success. But even as the Allied troops waded ashore, a new threat was looming and attention was being given to the role of the Codebreakers in the post-war era.

http://www.bletchleypark.org/content/hist/worldwartwo/stratciphers.rhtm
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Re: Guerra de espionaje y contra-espinaje Británico - 2 Guerra

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 21/11/2013, 12:54 pm

BREAKING NAVAL ENIGMA (DOLPHIN AND SHARK)
by Ralph Erskine
This note outlines the methods used by BP's Hut 8 to break naval Enigma. There can be little doubt that the naval Enigma decrypts helped to shorten the war, although it is not possible to give a precise period.
The German Navy's three-rotor Enigma machine (M3) was identical to the model used by the German Army and Air Force, but it was supplied with three additional rotors, VI, VII and VIII, which were reserved exclusively for naval use. However, the German Navy also employed codebooks, which shortened signals as a precaution against shore high-frequency direction-finding, and some manual ciphers. The codebooks most often used were the Kurzsignalheft (short signal book) for reports such as sighting convoys, and the Wetterkurzschlüssel (weather short signal book) for weather reports. The relevant codegroups were super-enciphered on Enigma before being transmitted by radio.
Naval Enigma signals used a number of different ciphers, each with its own daily key (rotor order, ring settings, plugboard connections and basic rotor setting). The principal cipher was Heimisch (known to BP as Dolphin), for U-boats and surface ships in home waters, including the Atlantic. At least 14 other naval Enigma ciphers were used during the war.
Most ciphers had Allgemein (general) and Offizier keys. Offizier signals were first enciphered using the plugboard connections from monthly Offizier keylists. The complete message was then enciphered a second time using the Allgemein key. A few ciphers also had Stab (Staff) keys, which were also doubly enciphered, but had their own special settings. Although BP's Hut 8, which was responsible for the attack on naval Enigma, often broke Offizier signals, albeit often a week or more later, it seldom, if ever, solved Stab.
BP received an Enigma machine and rotors I to V from the Poles in August 1939. Marian Rejewski, the Polish cryptanalyst, had reconstructed the wiring of those rotors using advanced mathematics. A statement in a talk last year that the Poles borrowed a Wehrmacht machine does the Poles a considerable injustice - the borrowed machine was the completely different commercial model. The British recovered rotors VI and VII from the crew of U-33 on 12 February 1940, while rotor VIII was captured in August 1940 - unfortunately no one now knows how or where. After that, Hut 8 had all eight rotors, but it still could not break naval Enigma.
In June and July 1940, using some cleartext and cipher text captured from the patrol boat, VP 26, Hut 8 had solved the naval Enigma traffic for six days in April, with the aid of the first bombe (a high speed key-finding aid). That bombe, which was Alan Turing's brainchild, was much slower than the bombes with the “diagonal board” invented by Gordon Welchman. The improved bombe, with the board, came into service from September on. The electro-mechanical bombes were not computers or even forerunners of the computer, since they did not have anything remotely resembling a computer's internal architecture.
Hut 8 faced three main problems in trying to break naval Enigma, even after the advanced bombes entered service-
the system for indicating the message key (the rotor starting position for the specific signal) was “operator proof” in that it was a book system, which did not depend upon an operator selecting the message key;
 
 
 
 
 
the Navy's eight rotors could be arranged in 336 different ways (8x7x6) and not merely 60 (5x4x3) as with Army or Air Force Enigma. A bombe run using all the rotor order combinations would therefore take over five times longer for naval Enigma than Air Force Enigma - and bombes were always in very scarce supply until large numbers of US Navy bombes became operational in the autumn of 1943;
“cribs” (probable plain text, from which bombe menus were derived) were almost non-existent.
In early 1941, with the help of captures from a commando raid in the Lofotens, Hut 8 broke some naval Enigma for February and April. But few, if any, of the decrypts were available in time for them to be operationally useful to the Admiralty's OIC.
Hut 8 was not able to read the Dolphin traffic without delay until June and July 1941. It did so using keys captured in specially planned “snatch” operations from the weather ships München and Lauenburg. The resulting intelligence at last enabled the OIC to re-route many convoys to evade the few U-boats (about 20) then in the North Atlantic. Re-routeing convoys on the basis of Ultra (or “special intelligence”) saved many lives and hundreds of thousands of tons of vital shipping, although one assessment that 1.5 to 2 million tons were saved in the second half of 1941 is over-simplistic.
The June and July decrypts gave Hut 8 enough insight into the traffic to break Dolphin cryptanalytically from the beginning of August 1941. In finding Dolphin keys, BP was helped because the order in which the rotors were inserted in the machine changed only every two days. On the second day, a bombe run on the first day's rotor order would therefore find the second day's settings in under 20 minutes - if a crib for a bombe menu was available. This halved BP's work on the naval keys, saving it a considerable amount of precious bombe time. The capture of indicator books from U-110 on 9 May 1941 also greatly assisted in developing a method (“Banburismus”) of working out which rotor was the “fast” rotor in the right hand slot in the machine, which much reduced the number of bombe runs required.
Without cribs, the bombes were useless. Although in many respects the Kriegsmarine used Enigma more carefully than the other services, some units were not issued with Enigma. Some messages were therefore enciphered using manual systems as well as Enigma. Decrypts of the hand-enciphered signals provided cribs if the same signals were enciphered on Enigma.
Sometimes minelaying operations (known as “Gardening”) were carried out by the Royal Air Force in order to afford Hut 8 cribs. The Germans had to send signals about the re-opening of sealanes after they had been swept for mines. The signals about the cleared channels were often sent in naval Enigma and a manual cipher known as the Werftschlüssel (“dockyard cipher”). When BP broke the Werftschlüssel, Hut 8 had plaintext if there was an identical Enigma signal. Without help from the section in BP's Hut 4 which solved the Werftschlüssel, there would have been much less intelligence from Dolphin.
Manual ciphers broken by BP's weather subsection, based in Hut 10, provided the other main source of cribs. Short weather signals were transmitted by Atlantic U-boats as an essential part of the German war effort. The signals were encoded on the Wetterkurzschlüssel before encipherment on Enigma. From February 1941 on, Hut 10 broke the naval meteorological cipher, which used the U-boats' reports. In early May 1941, BP received a copy of the 1940 edition of the Wetterkurzschlüssel from München. Hut 8 could now reconstruct the exact text of the U-boats' encoded weather signals - and so had a second source of cribs.
 
 
 
 
 
BP suffered a massive reverse on 1 February 1942 when a new Enigma machine (M4) came into service on Triton (codenamed Shark by BP), a special cipher for the Atlantic and Mediterranean U-boats. Although BP had found the wiring of the new rotor in M4 in December 1941, the combination of M4, a separate cipher (Shark) and the introduction of a second edition of the Wetterkurzschlüssel proved devastating. Deprived of cribs, BP became blind against Shark.
Fortunately, M4 was not a true four-rotor machine. The fourth rotor (beta) was the right-hand half of a split reflector and was not interchangeable with rotors I to VIII. Beta could be set as part of the message key, giving M4 the equivalent of 26 different reflectors, but M4's rotors could still only be mixed in 336 (8x7x6) different ways - not 3,024 (9x8x7x6). But without the Wetterkurzschlüssel cribs, Hut could not attack Shark.
However, at one setting of beta, M4 was completely compatible with M3, which was M4's undoing. Eventually, the second edition of the Wetterkurzschlüssel was seized from U-559 on 30 October 1942, before it sank near Port Said. After hundreds of bombe runs, Hut 8 found that beta was at neutral when enciphering the weather reports: M4 was being used only in M3 mode. A three-rotor bombe run on, say, 60 rotor combinations would therefore take only about 17 hours instead of the 442 hours (18 days) it would have required if M4 had used its full potential.
On 13 December 1942, BP sent teleprints to the OIC setting out the positions of over 12 Atlantic U-boats as established from Shark weather signals for early December. Hut 8 had penetrated M4 Shark with the help of the met broadcasts broken by Hut 10. The subsequent intelligence from Shark, although sometimes badly delayed, undoubtedly played a critical part in the Battle of the Atlantic, probably helping to save from 500,000 to 750,000 tons of shipping in December 1942 and January 1943 alone.
Hut 8's use of the Wetterkurzschlüssel against Triton was to be short-lived. A 3rd edition of the weather short signal book came into operation on 10 March 1943 - again depriving BP of Shark cribs. BP had feared that the change would blind it for several months, but by using short signal sighting reports (made by U-boats in contact with convoys and encoded from the Kurzsignalheft) as cribs, Hut 8 re-entered Shark again on 19 March and broke it for 90 out of the next 112 days before 30 June. The Kurzsignalheft short sighting reports also used M4 in M3 mode - and U-559 had yielded a copy of the Kurzsignalheft.
British and US Navy four-rotor bombes entered service in June and August 1943, respectively, but some July and August keys still took up to 26 days to solve. However, from September on, Shark was generally broken within 24 hours, although doing so was never plain sailing. At the end of 1943, work on Shark was transferred to the US Navy's Op-20-G codebreaking unit in Nebraska Avenue, Washington, because the US Navy had so many bombes (50 in operation by mid-November, with a further 30 installed), and they were more reliable than the British model.
Hut 8's attack on naval Enigma was led by Hugh Alexander, with his best known colleague probably being the mathematical genius Alan Turing (called “the Prof.” by his colleagues, although he was not a professor). Others included Jack Good, Leslie Yoxall and Shaun Wylie. When decrypts became available, they were translated by Hut 4, which then sent their full text by teleprinter to the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC) in London. Unlike the other service departments, the Admiralty received the decrypts themselves, and not mere summaries.
The main role for Ultra from naval Enigma was probably in the re-routeing of convoys, but it had, of course, many other uses. Ultra helped in the sinking of the Scharnhorst in
 
 
 
 
 
December 1943. Armed raiders, such as Atlantis were tracked down and sunk with its assistance. And the US Navy employed Ultra offensively in 1943 in its many sinkings of the important U-tankers, which applied a multiplier effect to the U-boats by refuelling them at sea.
While the work of many people at BP and elsewhere was of vital importance in breaking of naval Enigma, it required something approaching a minor miracle before Shark succumbed. Without the bravery of Lieutenant Anthony Fasson, Able Seaman Colin Grazier and 16 year-old Tommy Brown in retrieving the Wetterkurzschlüssel and Kurzsignalheft from U-559, Shark could not have been broken before four-rotor bombes came into service in June 1943 - if then. Tony Fasson and Colin Grazier were posthumously awarded the George Cross, and Tommy Brown (who survived) received the George Medal. Without their bravery, Shark would not have been broken for many months, if at all. The Allies would not then have established naval supremacy in the Atlantic until the second half of 1943 at the earliest and the invasion of Europe would probably have been delayed until 1945. Few acts of courage by three individuals can ever have had so far-reaching consequences. Without Ultra from Shark, the U-boats would still have been defeated in the long run, but the cost in human life in the global conflict would have been even more terrible than it was.
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Re: Guerra de espionaje y contra-espinaje Británico - 2 Guerra

Mensaje por Rogersukoi27 el 21/11/2013, 12:57 pm

PARA que no digan que las mujeres no pueden guardar un secreto!








Las mujeres que ayudaron a descifrar códigos en la Segunda Guerra Mundial
Cuando tenían 18 años, estas mujeres encontraron pistas de inteligencia en los cables secretos entre generales nazis
Por Charlotte Lytton
Domingo, 17 de noviembre de 2013 a las 10:10



 
 




Lo más importante












(CNN) — “Este es el verificador Noruega”, dijo la voz a través del codificador. “Tengo una buena parada para ti en Stavanger”.
Nadie en el mundo exterior podría haber conocido el significado de estas palabras.
Pero dentro de Bletchley Park, un enclave para romper códigos durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial en el campo inglés de Buckinghamshire, Ruth Bourne, de 18 años, descubrió una pieza vital de inteligencia.
Al trabajar junto con miles de mujeres para descifrar señales alemanas codificadas enviadas entre generales nazis, el descubrimiento de Bourne significó transmitir la información a sus superiores para evaluar si era otra pieza del rompecabezas de descifrado.
Con cada habitación nombrada en honor de un país que había sido derribado por los nazi, y cada máquina bautizada como una de sus ciudades, el sistema de revisión sencillo pero efectivo de Bletchley Park fue crucial en la derrota del régimen de Hitler.
Una cultura de secretismo
Sin embargo, lejos de ser un grupo de decodificadores experimentados, los reclutas consistían principalmente en un grupo de militares adolescentes; un puñado de genios de los crucigramas que podían completar el crucigramas del periódico The Daily Telegraph en menos de 12 minutos, y muchas chicas de 18 años sacadas de sus tranquilas ciudades natales.
“Fue en medio de la guerra cuando recibí una llamada que decía que iba a trabajar en la guerra para apoyar los esfuerzos de Gran Bretaña desde casa”, explica Margaret Bullen, de 88 años, una operadora de cables de máquina que sirvió desde 1942 hasta el final de la guerra.
“Antes de comenzar a trabajar, nos dijeron que firmáramos la Ley Oficial de Secretos, lo que era una experiencia algo aterradora para alguien tan joven y tan ingenua como yo”, dice Becky Webb de 90 años, quien se unió a los esfuerzos de guerra a los 18 años en 1941. “¡No tenía idea de cómo cumpliría con eso!”.
Pero cumplir era la única opción, lo que hizo que estas tres jóvenes; Webb, Bullen y Bourne, fueran guardias feroces de la decodificación durante varias décadas.
De hecho, no fue hasta 30 años después que el velo de secretismo de Bletchley comenzó a levantarse, después de la publicación de The Ultra Secret; un libro revelador del exoficial de la Real Fuerza Aérea británica, Frederic W. Winterbotham.
La exposición de 1974 reveló cómo la inteligencia Ultra fue utilizada para interceptar la comunicación detrás de líneas enemigas y para difundir información vital a Gran Bretaña y sus aliados. Aunque Winterbotham fue acusado de embellecer y agrandar su papel en el relato, sin él, la historia verdadera de qué pasó dentro de la operación de rompimiento de código de Reino Unido nunca podría haberse conocido.
“Suena extraño que conozcamos tan poco sobre lo que pasaba, pero así fue”, reflexiona Bullen.
“Fui enviada a vivir con una pareja a la que se le ordenó acogerme debido a la guerra. Nunca me preguntaron qué hacía allí (nadie lo hizo), ni siquiera los trabajadores locales que nos servían café en la cafetería o en nuestro almuerzo, a pesar del hecho de que un grupo de mujeres de 18 años repentinamente llegó a esta pequeña aldea”, explica.
“Solo escuché el nombre Colossus (la máquina en la que trabajaba) unas tres décadas después de que la guerra terminó, y no fue sino hasta que después visité Bletchley Park que dije: ‘aquí es donde trabajé, ¡esto fue lo que hice!’”.
“Estoy encantada de que podamos discutir nuestro tiempo allí ahora que todo salió, y doy pláticas sobre el tema cuando me lo piden”, dice entusiasmada Webb. “¡He dado 97 hasta la fecha!”.
Heroínas silenciosas
Sin embargo, para muchas de las jóvenes en Bletchley, la eliminación del velo de clandestinidad se presentó demasiado tarde, ya que la mayoría de los padres de las trabajadoras fallecieron antes de que el esfuerzo de descifrado se volviera público.
Bourne, una recluta naval de 18 años que fue enviada a una de las ubicaciones de expansión del parque en Eastcote (a las afueras de Londres), fue una de las muchas que nunca pudo decirle a sus seres queridos sobre su contribución en la guerra.
“Llevabas dos vidas allí”, recuerda. “Una vida era en la Manzana A, donde comías en en el comedor, y hablabas sobre novios, conseguir trenes a Londres, y donde encontrar medias de nylon negro”.
“La Manzana B era donde trabajábamos, rodeadas de paredes altas, alambres de púas y dos infantes de marina que custodiaban el lugar. Si podías hacer que tu voz se escuchara sobre el sonido de 12 máquinas Turing Bombe, era la única vez en la que podías hablar sobre el trabajo; pero nunca lo hacías”, explica. “Nunca supe lo que mis compañeras hacían, y viceversa, y mis padres nunca se enteraron de nada”.
Después de que el régimen nazi cayó en 1945, muchas de las mujeres de Bletchley regresaron a casa, mientras que otras se quedaron involucradas con el trabajo del ejército. Bourne trabajó como destructora de cables: desoldar los muchos cables que estuvieron conectados cuidadosamente en las operaciones de inteligencia en la guerra, mientras que Webb fue enviada al Pentágono para parafrasear mensajes japoneses traducidos para su transmisión a los oficiales.
“Al salir de Bletchley, realmente no teníamos habilidades”, recuerda Bourne. “¡Aparte de saber cómo mantener un secreto!”.
El libro de Winterbotham pudo haber sido la primera vez que la historia de los descifradores de códigos de la Segunda Guerra Mundial entró al terreno de la cultura popular, pero ciertamente no fue la última, con el drama televisivo The Bletchley Circle que se transmite y es popular en Reino Unido y Estados Unidos.
La cultura de secretismo que alguna vez amenazó a Bletchley de ser eliminado de los libros de historia ha terminado verdaderamente.
El Museo Nacional de Computación en Bletchley Park en Milton Keynes, Reino Unido, tiene en exhibición la exposición “Mujeres en la computación”.

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